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Sharing of Benefits or Enclosure of the Commons? Investigating the Compatibility 
of National and Local Access and Benefit Sharing Mechanisms in Peru. 
Emily Catherine Taylor 
Abstract 
The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) declared that genetic diversity, 
considered for centuries to be the common heritage of humankind, would become the 
property of the sovereign state in which it is contained. The Convention also contained a 
special provision expressing respect for indigenous rights to their genetic resources. In 
2002 Peru became the first country in the world to enact a national law for Protection of 
Traditional Knowledge. Prior to this legal regime, customary governance mechanisms of 
Andean communities have been the primary means of governing the conservation, use 
and sharing of genetic resources and traditional knowledge. The objective of this research 
project is to understand from the perspective of policy makers involved in the 
development of this law, as well as from the perspective of community members and a 
small grassroots NGO, how this law creates both opportunities and constraints for local 
governance mechanisms. 
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The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) declared that genetic resources, 
considered for centuries to be the common heritage of humankind, would become the 
property of the sovereign state in which they are contained. The Convention also 
contained a special provision expressing respect for the rights of indigenous communities 
over their traditional knowledge. In 2002 Peru (a signatory of the CBD) became the first 
country in the world to enact a national law for the Protection of Traditional Knowledge. 
Prior to this legal regime, customary governance mechanisms of Andean communities 
have been the primary means for governing the conservation, use and sharing of genetic 
resources and traditional knowledge. Field research was carried out in Peru, to understand 
from the perspective of policy makers and legal experts involved in the development of 
this law, as well as from the perspective of community members and a small grassroots 
NGO, how this law creates both opportunities and constraints for local governance 
mechanisms. 
A qualitative case study approach was designed in order to investigate how changes in 
biodiversity governance occurring at the international and national level will impact local 
governance mechanisms. In other words this research project was designed to 
investigate how the Peruvian Law for the Protection of Traditional Knowledge, shaped 
by the Convention on Biological Diversity, will impact customary governance 
mechanisms of the ANDES Potato Park. The Potato Park and ANDES NGO were 
chosen for this in-depth case study because ANDES and the communities of the Potato 
Park are currently working together to develop a local governance regime based on 
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customary governance mechanisms to protect their knowledge and resources. Field-work 
was carried out in Peru, to address the following research questions: 
-In what ways does the Peruvian law for the Protection of Traditional Knowledge create 
opportunities to strengthen the ability of customary governance mechanisms of the 
ANDES Potato Park to manage traditional knowledge and associated biodiversity? 
-In what ways does the Peruvian Law for the Protection of Traditional Knowledge 
threaten the ability of customary governance mechanisms of the ANDES Potato Park to 
manage traditional knowledge and biodiversity? 
-How could the compatibility of the Law for the Protection of Traditional Knowledge and 
the customary governance mechanisms of the ANDES Potato Park be improved? 
The first set of interviews were conducted in Lima with individuals who were involved in 
the development of the Law for the Protection of Traditional Knowledge, and/or are 
currently involved in the implementation of its principles, and/or have significant 
expertise regarding this piece of legislation. The second stage of data collection 
approached the same basic questions from the perspective of representatives of a 
grassroots NGO, and the six communities of the Potato Park. Data collection consisted 
of semi-structured interviews, one focus group and a community assembly meeting. 
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It was found that community governance mechanisms are important for a number of 
reasons. Most importantly, to protect the complex local systems in which traditional 
knowledge and genetic resources are embedded and to guide community conservation 
practices. Analysis of research findings indicated that the Law for the Protection of 
Traditional Knowledge poses a number of threats to community governance mechanisms. 
First, because the law is rooted in Western intellectual property law and is overly focused 
on the commercialization of these resources, it fails to adequately reflect the 
community's vision of the world. As a result the Law for the Protection of Traditional 
Knowledge does not address divergent ideas about what it means to "protect" traditional 
knowledge and genetic resources. Another major weakness, according to community 
members is that the Law proposes inappropriate decision making structures and legal 
tools resulting in fear and suspicion at the level of the community. 
At the same time findings suggest that the Law for Protection of Traditional Knowledge 
supports community governance mechanisms in a number of ways. First, it is promising 
that both the state and community regimes for protecting traditional knowledge and 
genetic resources are flexible, dynamic and capable of responding to new realities. There 
is also mutual recognition and respect for decentralized decision-making with regard to 
these resources. Findings further indicate that the compatibility of these legal regimes can 
and must be improved in a number of ways. Indigenous peoples must participate 
meaningfully in the adaptation and implementation of this law, and new institutional and 
organizational structures are required to enable meaningful participation of indigenous 
communities in decision- making processes. Finally, given the integral role and function 
of traditional governance in the maintenance and conservation of traditional knowledge 
and genetic resources, it is imperative that any national law for the protection of 
traditional knowledge strengthen rather than undermine these local mechanisms. 
Introduction: 
For centuries, customary law practices have been used to govern the conservation, 
use, and sharing of genetic resources and traditional knowledge. As a result of these 
practices at the community level, and its unique geographical context, among other 
factors, Peru remains one of the most bio-diverse countries in the world. Not only have 
communities been successful in preserving large amounts of biological diversity, but they 
have also been successful in using community knowledge to create new and valuable 
variations of traditional crops. The objective of this research project is to understand how 
the Peruvian law for the Protection of Traditional Knowledge, enacted in 2002, will 
impact customary governance mechanisms of indigenous communities in Peru and their 
conservation of traditional knowledge and genetic resources. More specifically the 
perspectives of policy makers and legal experts involved in the development of this law 
will be compared with those of community members and a grassroots NGO to understand 
of how this law creates both opportunities and constraints for traditional governance 
mechanisms. Fieldwork was carried out in Peru in order to investigate the following 
research questions: 
• In what ways does the Peruvian law for the Protection of Traditional Knowledge 
create opportunities to strengthen the ability of customary governance 
mechanisms of the ANDES Potato Park to manage traditional knowledge and 
associated biodiversity? 
• In what ways does the Peruvian Law for the Protection of Traditional Knowledge 
threaten the ability of customary governance mechanisms of the ANDES Potato 
Park to manage traditional knowledge and associated biodiversity? 
• How could the compatibility of the Law for the Protection of Traditional 
knowledge and customary governance mechanisms of the ANDES Potato Park be 
improved? 
The first three chapters of this thesis provide a review of the relevant literature. Chapter 
one provides a theoretical overview of the different approaches to natural resource 
ownership, including community-based co-management. The second chapter will then 
focus on the relationship of indigenous communities in Peru with their agro-biodiversity 
and traditional knowledge. The final chapter of the literature review will address the 
Peruvian law for the Protection of Traditional Knowledge in Peru as it relates to 
community governance of these resources. Following the literature review, the fourth 
chapter will outline the methodology and fieldwork component of the research project. 
Lastly, findings will be synthesized and analyzed respectively in the final two chapters. 
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Chapter One: Sustainable Development and Natural Resource 
Management 
Abstract: The objective of this section is to first provide a working definition of 
sustainable development. Following, a typology of the major forms of natural resources 
ownership will be provided. Finally, the typology itself will be expanded to a multi-tiered 
governance framework, including an analysis of the potential of community-based co-
management to contribute to sustainable development. 
Sustainable Development: Defining a Moving Goal Post: 
For the purposes of this paper sustainable development will be used to refer not 
only environmental protection (in this case the conservation of biodiversity), but also the 
sustainability of the culture, livelihoods, and way of life of those communities who have 
conserved, adapted, and continue to rely on these resources for their wellbeing. When 
using this term, it will be assumed that poverty reduction and environmental conservation 
are not competing, mutually exclusive goals. Rather sustainable development will be 
defined upon the assumption that rural poverty alleviation is a necessary precondition and 
complementary goal for environmental conservation of biological diversity. This 
definition is based upon the theoretical works of authors such as James K. Boyce who 
have argued that poverty alleviation is warranted not only as a basic human right, but also 
because poverty reduction is inextricably linked to global environmental conservation 
and maintenance (Boyce & Pastor, 2001). 
Boyce challenges both advocates and opponents of stronger environmental 
protection, who argue that poverty reduction is an incompatible goal (Boyce, & Pastor, 
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2001). Instead, Boyce makes the case that global environmental protection is oftentimes 
contingent upon the well-being, and livelihoods of the poor. According to Boyce, this 
relationship is the result of two main factors: that poor people can choose to meet their 
daily needs and improve their livelihoods without harming the environment; and 
secondly so that poor rural communities can be empowered to resist the environmentally 
destructive activities of outsiders through democratic processes (Boyce & Pastor, 2001). 
Boyce's justification is based on his finding that the greatest threat to environmental 
preservation and maintenance is large inequalities in both wealth and power (Boyce 
2001). 
Therefore, based on this argument, sustainable development will be 
operationalized upon the assumption that poverty reduction and environmental protection 
are two sides of the same coin (Boyce & Shelley, 2003). While the relationship between 
rural livelihoods and biodiversity conservation will be explored in depth later in this 
literature review, it is necessary to claim from the outset that sustainable development, 
for the purposes of this paper, will be a complex and multifaceted concept including 
conservation of environmental resources, poverty reduction, and democratization of 
decision making. 
Natural Resources Management and Sustainable Development 
This literature review will begin by providing an overview of some of the key 
theoretical debates about the management of natural resources. A typology of the major 
approaches to natural resource ownership will be provided followed by an in-depth 
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overview of the potential of community-based co-management to contribute to 
sustainable development. Although information pertaining specifically to biological 
resources and biodiversity will be included in some instances, this section is meant to 
focus on natural resource ownership in its broadest sense before moving on to a more 
detailed analysis of biodiversity in the next section. 
Typology of Natural Resource Management 
Providing a comprehensive overview of the different forms of natural resource 
ownership is not an easy task. The convention is to categorize natural resource 
management into four major classifications- open access, state ownership, private 
ownership, and communal ownership. In reality resource management systems do not fit 
neatly into these compartments. It is important to note that contemporary environmental 
management systems are large and complex and in many cases continually evolve and 
adapt to new environmental, political and social demands (Paavola, 2006). 
Environmental governance systems often combine multiple methods of environmental 
resource ownership, and are increasingly based on multi-level approaches, operating 
simultaneously at local, national, regional and international levels (Paavola, 2006). In 
many cases it is also necessary to distinguish between de facto and de jure rights in order 
to understand the impacts of the different management regimes (Cole, 2000). This being 
said, while a simplified overview of the different modes of natural resources may not be 
generalizable across every political, ecological and cultural setting, an introduction to this 
classification provides a useful model to begin thinking about the different strengths and 
weaknesses of each approach. 
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Open Access or res nelius Approach to Natural Management 
Under a res nelius resource management regime (synonymous for the purposes of 
this paper with open-access) resources are considered to be "non-exclusive in nature and 
the property of no-one" (Berkes, 1995, 371). According to Berkes this form of 
ownership has two distinguishing characteristics. First, res nelius resources cannot be 
restricted from potential users, and secondly through the use of these resources each user 
inevitably compromises the welfare of others (Berkes, 1995). 
Any discussion of open access regimes usually begins with a review of the 
famous parable, "The Tragedy of the Commons" offered by Garett Hardin in 1968. In 
this seminal article Hardin proposed that the use open-access resources (which he 
incorrectly termed common resources) inevitably leads to environmental destruction and 
degradation (Appell, 1993). According to Hardin, under a res nelius regime, rational 
individuals would maximize short-term self-benefits by over-utilizing open-access 
resources, resulting in the destruction of these resources (Uphoff, 1998). The short- term 
benefits of this behaviour, would be greater for each individual, than the short-term costs 
for the same individuals resulting from the depletion of the common resources (Uphoff, 
1998). Hardin concluded, "ruin is the destination toward which all men rush each 
pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. 
Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all" (Hardin, 1968, 1244). While Hardin's article 
is widely contested to this day, he proposed that the only solution to the tragedy of the 
commons (or more accurately, open access) is state ownership, or privatization of open 
access resources. While Hardin admits that state coercion, and privatization will not 
result in "perfectly just" distribution patterns, he proposed, "injustice is preferable to total 
ruin" (Hardin, 1968,1247). 
Hardin's analysis constitutes the primary claim against this form of ownership. 
That is that open access resources will be exploited at an unsustainable rate unless some 
type of property rights regime regulates and enforces limitations on their use (Cole, 
2000). In addition to the environmental concerns associated with open access regimes, 
this ownership regime is also criticized for resulting in an inefficient, and highly unequal 
distribution of benefits (Boyce & Shelley, 2003). 
However, others argue that there are in fact some instances in which the costs of 
creating property rights and governance systems are too high relative to the value of the 
resources at hand, to justify the creation and enforcement of a property rights regime 
(Paavola, 2006). From this standpoint, whether or not a resource should remain 
ungoverned, depends to a large degree of the value of the resource, relative to the costs of 
governing this resource. Of course taking a political economy perspective, it also 
depends on who would be incurring the relative costs and benefits associated with 
regulation. As benefits associated with governance of a particular resource increase, or 
the costs to implement such a regime decrease, the justification for implementing an 
ownership regime is strengthened (Paavola, 2006), particularly when the benefits accrue 
to the politically and economically marginalized sectors of a population (Boyce & 
Shelley, 2003). 
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State Ownership of Natural Resources 
Under a state-led regime, natural resources are considered public property, which 
fall under the jurisdiction of the government (Yandle & Morriss, 2001). Generally 
speaking, under a state-centered approach, governments assume responsibility for the 
governance, conservation, regulation and distribution of natural resources. This approach 
relies on regulatory tools such as government taxation, politically determining the bundle 
of rights of different actors in society, and ensuring compliance with the state led regime 
(Yandle & Morriss, 2001). It is important to note that while a state ownership regime 
rests the regulation authority with the government, this approach may be practiced in 
coordination with other forms of ownership as dictated by the state. 
The arguments for state ownership of natural resources, often relate back to 
Hardin's analysis of the Tragedy of the Commons. It is held, that state regulations are 
necessary to govern individual use of resources, such that there are constraints placed 
upon each individual's ability to consume natural resources and degrade the natural 
environment. Others argue that it is only through state led democratic decision-making 
processes that sustainable development goals can be achieved. While historically, state-
regulationism has been the dominant approach to environmental conservation, over the 
last two decades there have been serious theoretical challenges levied at this approach to 
environmental conservation. 
1 The bundle of rights theory, is a commonly used metaphor in law and economics literature. It compares 
property ownership to a bundle of sticks, with each stick representing a property owner's right to that 
resource for example, the right to own land, to sell it, to give it away or to choose to exercise some, all or 
none of these rights. 
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Critics argue that state led approaches are inappropriate mechanisms for achieving 
sustainable development because they are often inequitable and inefficient. State led 
approaches have developed a reputation for undermining local capacities for natural 
resource management and exacerbating inequalities by transferring management power 
away from local resource users to inefficient centralized bureaucracies and corrupt 
political elites (Korten, 1986). State-regulationism has been further criticized for its 
inability to accommodate local conservation needs. Standardized rules are often 
inflexible and therefore unable to accommodate diverse needs and preferences of 
stakeholders, including those of community management systems (Korten, 1986). 
Finally, there are those who argue that the democratic system itself is an 
unsuitable mechanism for decision-making regarding natural resources. From this point 
of view it is proposed that democratic societies often choose policies, which result in 
unsustainable use of natural resources where more powerful actors are still able to control 
the outcomes of the decision making process. According to Alston and Mueller, this may 
be due to a problem of education or sharing information with the public (Alston & 
Mueller, 2003). Similarly, others argue that the democratic system is an inappropriate 
mechanism for overcoming problems such as free riding, and democratic processes may 
result in sub-optimal decision-making (Corbera et. al, 2007). Some critics also point to 
the prevalence of government corruption as a major factor undermining states ability to 
achieve sustainable development goals (Deacon & Mueller, 2004). 
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Taking a more neutral stance on state led approach to natural resource 
management is Boyce, who argues that the potential of state ownership of natural 
resources to contribute to sustainable development objectives, is entirely dependant on 
the political and economic distribution of power within that country (Boyce & Shelley, 
2003). 
"Disparities of power and wealth influence not only how nature's pie is 
sliced, but also its overall magnitude. When disparities are great, those at 
top of the political and economic ladder can more easily pollute the air and 
water and deplete the natural resource base of those at the bottom. When 
disparities are small, those on the bottom rungs of the shorter ladder are 
better able to defend themselves. A democratic distribution of power and an 
equitable distribution of wealth, therefore, can help to protect the 
environment. Conversely, an oligarchic distribution of power and an 
inequitable distribution of wealth can exacerbate environmental 
degradation" (Boyce, 2002, 1). 
In other words, it is impossible to advocate for state ownership as the most appropriate 
form of ownership, without disaggregating the impacts of different political realities, as 
the results are highly dependent on the democratic accountability of that state and the 
distribution of wealth and power amongst its constituents. 
Privatization of Natural Resources 
In recent years, many states have moved away from state ownership of natural resources, 
increasingly granting private property rights to private owners. By definition, a private 
property regime exists when ownership vested in an individual or group of individuals is 
legally enforced, exclusive and transferable (Feeney et. al, 1990). This trend has led to a 
diminished reliance on organized, regulatory control (and even participatory processes) 
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and rather relies instead on the market and other voluntary structures to achieve 
environmental and sustainable development objectives (Lemos & Agarwal, 2006). 
The primary argument for private property ownership of natural resources is that 
individual rights over resources allow for the creation of markets for environmental 
resources that will ensure that the resources are allocated where they achieve the greatest 
economic return. It is argued that this approach will contribute to social welfare indirectly 
by increasing the overall productivity of a society. Those who advocate for private 
ownership of natural resources, posit that private property regimes, maximize the total 
value of natural resources and ensure that these resources are distributed through the 
mechanisms of the invisible hand, to their most valued use(r)s (Posener, 1992). Private 
property rights over natural resources are seen by proponents of this approach, as a 
necessary pre-condition to ensure that markets can stimulate human innovation and 
ingenuity resulting in the most productive and efficient distribution of natural resources. 
This said, there are a number of advocates of the privatization of natural resources 
who argue that privatization is not only the most efficient form of ownership, but also the 
most appropriate means for attaining sustainable development goals. The privatization of 
natural resources is now being promoted across developed and developing countries 
based on this logic with the aim of increasing the efficiency of natural resource 
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management and distribution through the commodification of these resources (see text 
box below) (Corbera, Brown, 2007). Addressing, the conservation dimension, advocates 
argue that economic incentives are necessary signals for bringing about appropriate 
behaviours and uses of natural resources (Corbera et. al, 2007). On the poverty reduction 
front, it is proposed that private rights over natural resources may provide important 
income earning opportunities for rural populations, particularly those whose livelihoods 
depend directly or indirectly on ecosystem goods and services in developing countries 
(Millenium Ecosystem Assessment, 2003). Beyond offering diversified income earning 
opportunities, it is also believed by some that as markets become more economically 
efficient and environmentally effective, that the exchange of privately held resources, by 
virtue of the invisible hand, will provide a more equitable and efficient distribution of 
benefits associated with environmental goods (Bawa & Gadgil, 1997; Pagiola et. al, 
2002). 
The literature cautioning against the privatization of natural resources has been 
stimulated largely in response to the growing trend towards privatization in both the 
developing and developed world. The major critique of private ownership and the 
Commodification of natural resources is the process by which resources are given value, often for the 
purpose of making them interchangeable. In Marxist political economy, commodification takes place when 
a monetary value is assigned to something that was not previously considered in market terms. The 
commodification of natural resources is often criticized on the grounds that certain resources that are 
fundamental to the survival of humankind should not be for sale and rather should remain in the common 
heritage of humankind. As resources become traded commodities on the market there is concern that 
market values will replace social values and respect for basic human rights in regulating the management 
and distribution of natural resources. Also of great concern to critics is the risk that assigning private 
property rights to natural resources, will inevitably result in a situation where resources essential for human 
survival will be distributed in a grossly unequal fashion. That is those people who do not have the 
monetary resources to access these resources through economic transactions will no longer have access. 
Alternatively, wealthy and powerful segments of the population will consecrate their power further by 
securing the lion's share of these resources. Thus society is making a trade off: poor people's right to 
natural resources vs. rich people's right to private property. 
20 
resulting markets for environmental resources, stems from deep concerns about 
procedural fairness and equitable distribution of benefits. Critiques of the procedural 
fairness of this approach argue that natural resources are public goods, and that prices put 
on natural resources are not reflective of the overall social value embodied in them. As a 
result when natural resources are privatized those who benefit the most from the market 
exchange of these resources, are often not those who need the resources the most for their 
very survival (Corbera et. al, 2007). 
This approach is further criticized for failing to recognize competing values and 
diversity of actors with stakes in environmental decision-making, particularly those of 
marginalized communities. Other critics caution that the privatization of natural 
resources is likely to favour the politically and economically powerful actors, and 
exacerbate existing inequalities. 
Community Based Management of Common Property Resources 
Under a community based- common-property regime, resource rights are held 
collectively by an identifiable community of interdependent users (Feeney et. al, 1990). 
Resources held under common ownership are by definition non-exclusive and non-
transferrable, and are most often shared equally amongst users. The rights of users may 
be legally recognized and protected or, in other cases, these rights are defacto or come 
from the community of users themselves (ibid). 
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While "commons" are often differentiated from other forms of and property rights 
regimes, in reality the lines are quite blurry. In the literature, the commons are most 
often confused with open-access regimes (most famously by Garret Harding). In the case 
of open-access, resources are completely unregulated and remain free and open to 
everyone. Alternatively, in the case of successfully managed "commons", the size of the 
community of users is often limited, and may be regulated in a highly sophisticated and 
effective manner by rules and regulation agreed upon and enforced by members of the 
community. Causing further confusion are the various roles that governments might play 
in protecting community commons. While commons, by definition cease to exist if they 
are formally regulated by the state, the subtlety is this: the state may, and in some cases 
must, play an important role in protecting the boundaries of the commons to prevent 
enclosure by other powerful actors. Finally, community commons differ from private 
property regimes in that ownership rights are not necessarily legally enforced, exclusive 
and are non-transferable (Feeney et. al, 1990). 
Largely as a result of research that took place in the 1980s decentralized modes of 
environmental governance including community-based initiatives have gained increased 
credibility (Agarwal & Lemos, 2006). Proponents of community-based commons argue 
that many communities have effective self-regulatory mechanisms, to govern the 
resources on which they depend. Community based, common property regimes have 
been important in many traditional societies around the world and draw upon the 
traditional ecological knowledge within traditional communities (Berkes, 1995). 
Research has shown that often local communities can be quite efficient in managing their 
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own resources by making use of their shared contextual understanding of those resources 
(Berkes, 1995). Common resources held by a community tend to be indivisible (difficult 
to separate into commodities) and require collective decision- making, cooperation in 
management and use, and enforcement of an agreed upon set of rules by the community 
of users. 
This approach includes but is not limited to indigenous systems of natural 
resource management, based on local values and knowledge and institutions. True 
community management refers to a system where community ownership and 
environmental management decisions are governed according to community based laws, 
norms and practices, rather than the conventions of the state (Paavoli, 2006; Alexander et. 
al, 2003). There are three major arguments for this approach to natural resource 
management: that decentralized authority will lead to greater efficiency; that decision 
making should be done by those who will be most impacted by its consequences thereby 
empowering local users; and lastly, that decision makers will be able to make use of 
detailed time and place specific knowledge about the natural resources at stake (Lemos & 
Agarwal, 2006). 
Ostrom for example, refutes the assumption in much of the policy literature that 
local governance of natural resources is inefficient, as well as the resulting policy 
prescriptions that optimal use requires either government intervention or private property 
rights (Ostrom, 1990). Scholars in this field have recorded thousands of independent 
instances of successful local governance initiatives (Lemos & Agarwal, 2006). This 
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approach is also justified on the basis of democratic accountability. Korten argues that in 
any democratic society, decision-making control must remain in the hands of those 
people who will be most directly impacted by the resulting consequences (Korten, 1986). 
The democratization outcome of community management cannot be separated from the 
poverty reduction goals of this approach. Pastor argues that it is imperative to increase 
the natural wealth of these communities in order to bring about significant and permanent 
reductions in poverty (Pastor, 2004). While mainstream development efforts to reduce 
poverty generally focus on increasing community incomes, this approach is often 
unstable at best in the long run. However, by increasing the natural wealth of 
communities and allowing local people to exercise their own governance structures 
presents a more holistic and lasting approach to poverty reduction (Langton et. al, 2005). 
Finally, community based approaches, unlike state and private ownership 
regimes, allow for the use of traditional ecological knowledge, and indigenous natural 
resource management approaches to provide locally appropriate and sustainable 
approaches for the conservation and sustainable use of natural resources (Posey, 1996). 
For this reason, community based management may be particularly suited to the interests 
of indigenous communities as well as the need to accommodate different values and 
cosmologies. Thus, under community ownership regimes, proponents argue that 
resources can be governed not only by the desire to maximize their full economic 
potential, but also by the desire to conserve these resources as an end in itself, to express 
cultural identity, to lay claims on ancestral lands, to safeguard local food security, and 
finally to secure economic and political autonomy. 
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While community based natural resource management has gained steam over the 
last couple of decades it is not a silver bullet solution to natural resources management. 
Berkes points out that while there is a tendency amongst theorists to assume a united 
"we" amongst and within communities, there is in reality a great diversity amongst and 
within local community users. Accordingly while some communities are adept and 
capable of managing their resources in a sustainable fashion, others simply do not have 
the historical and cultural background to provide adequate self-regulation and 
conservation of community resources (Berkes, 1995). Secondly, it is very difficult for 
communities to enforce their governance mechanisms upon outside actors when there are 
problems of exclusion and subtractibility (ibid). From this point of view, it is argued that 
state support in the form of legal institutions and other forms of regulationism become 
essential to the enforcement of community-based rights and responsibilities (ibid). 
Agarwal and Lemos further caution that in some cases the concept of community 
ownership is being used by powerful international actors as a further justification in the 
neoliberal project of rolling back the state (Lemos & Agarwal, 2006). According to these 
authors the trend towards community based management initiatives is largely a result of 
international pressure to undermine the role of the state as a reliable manager of the 
economy as well as the environment (Lemos & Agarwal, 2006). Following this line of 
reasoning, globalized pressures on states, including those imposed by international donor 
organizations as well as fiscal crisis in developing countries have left states with little 
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choice than to support the global trend towards community based management (Lemos & 
Agarwal, 2006). According to these authors, 
Whether these changes have occurred because of the alleged advantages of 
decentralized governance or because of the significant flows of aid funds 
tied to decentralized governance is difficult to judge. But the shift in favor 
of decentralization has brought alternative means and new political 
claimants to the fore in the process of governance as nation states attempt to 
reclaim governance through partnerships with local organizations (Lemos 
and Agarwal, 2006, 303). 
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-Private property regimes exist 
when ownership vested in an 
individual or group of 
individuals is legally enforced, 
exclusive and transferable. 
-Under a common property 
rights regime, resources must 
be held by an identifiable 
community of interdependent 
users 
-Resources held under 
common ownership are by 
definition non-exclusive and 
non-transferable, and are most 
often shared equally amongst 
users. The rights of users may 
be legally recognized and 
protected or, in other cases, 
these rights are defacto or 
come from the community of 
users themselves (ibid). 
-Private ownership 
rights establish 
individual incentives to 
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rights and resulting 
markets for 
environmental services 
may bring about 
important income 
earning opportunities 
and increase earning 
capacity of rural and/ or 
marginalized 
populations. 
-The invisible hand will 
result in a more 
equitable distribution of 
benefits. 
-Decision-making 
should be done by those 
most affect by its 
consequences. 
-Makes use of detailed 
time and place specific 
knowledge. 
-Increases the natural 
wealth of the poorest, 
bringing about long term 
reductions in poverty. 
-Locally appropriate and 
accommodates a diverse 
range of values and 
epistemologies. 
1 -Imperfections in the 
democratic process, the 
risk of corruption and 
manipulation by 
powerful actors. 
-Prices for natural 
resources do not tend to 
reflect their long-term 
social value resulting in 
over-exploitation. 
-Those benefiting the 
most from private 
ownership rights are 
often not directly reliant 
natural resources for 
their survival, and the 
most marginalized will 
likely be excluded from 
benefiting. 
-Market signals do not 
reflect different interests 
and values, especially 
those of marginalized 
communities. 
-Inequalities at the local 
level may be 
exacerbated. 
-Some communities do 
not have the internal 
capacity to manage their 
resources independently. 




-The rhetoric of 
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management can be 
used as an ideological 
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Multi-tiered Approach to Natural Resource Management 
It is necessary to conclude this typology with a caveat that, despite being 
conceptually useful, this broad typology is not generally applicable or useful for making 
decisions regarding real-life complex governance structures. A number of authors argue 
instead that there is a pressing need to develop a new analytical model for understanding 
complex-multi-tiered governance structures that do not fit into this basic typology 
(Paavola, 2006; Ostrom et. al, 1999; Ostrom, 2005; Lemos & Agarwal, 2006). 
Rather than examining "uni-planar" governance solutions independently, 
increasingly it is becoming important to understand the function of multi-tiered, complex 
governance structures operating simultaneously at the local, national, international and 
regional levels (Ostrom et. al, 1999). These new hybrid approaches to environmental 
governance combine the roles of markets, states and communities to create a range of 
innovative new approaches. These new mechanisms include public-private partnerships 
(state- market hybrid), private social partnerships (market community hybrid) and finally, 
co-management (hybrid of state and community management). The latter will be 
reviewed in more detail below. 
Community-based Co-management of Natural Resources 
Community-based co-management is an approach to natural resource 
management that shares power and responsibility amongst state and local resource users 
(Carlsson & Berkes, 2005). The general rationale for such an arrangement is that co-
management governance systems can capitalize on the strengths and limit the weaknesses 
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of governance systems based upon centralized state control and local resource 
management functioning independently (Carlsson & Berkes, 2005). While mainstream 
literature on co-management does focus mainly on state-community partnerships, various 
other actors in addition to the state and local resource users may be involved in complex 
systems of co-management including decentralized government agencies, NGOs, 
commercial actors and other stakeholders (Carlsson & Berkes, 2005). 
While there are a great diversity of governance systems that would fit this broad 
definition, typically (and for the purposes of this paper) co-management approaches 
include non traditional decision makers; encourage and support the participation of local 
communities in the management of their resources; distribute decision making power 
amongst various stakeholders; emphasize collaboration and negotiation amongst actors 
involved; respect and draw upon various knowledge systems (IUCN, 2002). Ideally, co-
management is not a static formalized agreement but rather an ongoing problem-solving 
process that includes negotiation, information exchange and learning amongst actors 
involved (Carlsson & Berkes, 2004). The majority of research on co-management of 
natural resources has focused primarily on the objectives of promoting equality and social 
justice, sustainable use of natural resources, and finally strengthening community-based 
and community-run initiatives (IUCN, 2002). 
Typology of Co-management Systems 
Given the broad definition of co-management there are a range of partnership 
arrangements fitting into this category ranging from a simple exchange of information to 
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a formal partnership (Carlsson & Berkes 2004). Berkes and Carlsson provide a useful 
typology for thinking about the variances in the range of co-management systems. 
At one extreme is what is called "co-management as an exchange system", which 
conceptualizes two distinct spheres of governance at the local and state level which 
interact with each other for the purposes of exchange of information, good and services. 
Slightly more participatory in nature, is what Berkes and Carlsson call "co-management 
as joint organization" in which case there is some degree of joint management and 
decision-making taking place. In this case each level of governance maintains its 
authority and relative autonomy. "Co-management as a state nested system" according to 
these authors is the most prevalent form of co-management being practiced around the 
world. In this situation while the state maintains legal rights over natural resource 
management in a particular sector, management responsibilities may be transferred to 
private actors to manage certain components within the sector. Private actors may 
include local communities in this case. Alternatively and less commonly practiced is a 
system these authors call "co-management as a community nested system". Under this 
system primary responsibility and decision making authority is in the hands of 
community members. It is important to note that in this case, the state may impose new 
restrictions or regulations over the management of natural resources, even those 
contained on private land. 
Finally, recognizing complexities and the difficulty fitting real life co-
management techniques into neat definitions offered above, Berkes and Carlsson offer a 
30 
fifth type of co-management practice called "co-management as a network". This 
conceptualization recognizes the complexities and variances within state and local levels 
of governance. For example since neither the state nor local communities reflect 
coherent and unified bodies, the network approach accounts for the fact that the state 
consists of multiple authorities and agencies that may have a range of management 
relations with a range of actors at the local level. This network approach is intended to 
recognize that if the range of relationships between state and local actors must be 
considered in their totality in order to understand what makes up the national co-
management system (Carlsson & Berkes, 2004). 
Strengths of the Co-management Approach to the Governance of Common 
Resources 
Proponents of the co-management approach to natural management argue that 
there are a number of strengths to this approach including: its capacity for constant 
adaptation; the flexibility to draw on management strengths at different levels of 
governance; increasing representation in decision making processes; while at the same 
time minimizing conflict resolution through power sharing (Carlsson & Berkes, 2004; 
IUCN, 2002). Ideally, co-management systems are not static formalized agreements but 
rather processes that include ongoing social learning, negotiations and adaptation of the 
system over time. Co-management processes and policies are constantly improved over 
time by incorporating a broad range of knowledge held by multiple social actors 
involved. For this reason, proponents suggest that compared to other forms of 
governance, co-management has a distinct capability to adapt to uncertainty and surprise 
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through a process of ongoing joint problem solving by multiple actors (Carlsson & 
Berkes, 2005). 
The co-management approach is also unique in that it allows complex multi-level 
management problems to be solved at different levels. Proponents argue that it is highly 
unlikely that local users alone will be able to provide adequate management for natural 
resources. At the same time, state centered approaches are considered inappropriate, and 
often dependant on what is happening at the local level. Co-management is in theory, a 
way of drawing on the relative strengths and weaknesses of each approach while 
minimizing the risks by dividing up management responsibilities in accordance with 
relative strengths and weaknesses of those actors involved (Agarwal & Lemos, 2006). 
While co-management is built upon community capacities for natural resource 
management, it is argued that state involvement is essential in order to develop enabling 
policies and institutional linkages to strengthen and protect local initiatives (Korten, 
1986). At the same time, co-management approaches are able to make use of local 
incentive structures, necessary to encourage willing and complementary conservation 
efforts among local resource users (Lemos & Agarwal, 2006). 
At the same time as allowing for novel modes of distributing management 
responsibility, co-management also requires increased representation in decision-making 
processes. The rationale behind co-management regimes is that including the 
perspectives and interests of communities in decision making processes provides the 
management benefit of both time and space specific information that is critical to solving 
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real, complex environmental problems. At the same time as providing this benefit to the 
overall management system, the system by its very essence becomes more equitable and 
democratic. While the state continues to play an important role in the management 
process its role becomes less authoritative and linkages between social actors become 
more coherent (Lemos & Agarwal, 2006). 
Finally, by providing a more democratic and representative management regime, 
co-management may reduce the risk of conflict over natural resources (IUCN, 2002). 
Co-management approaches have the potential to reduce the risk of conflict not only 
between communities and the state, but also between communities of local resources 
users (Carlsson & Berkes, 2005). By providing new linkages between social actors, co-
management offers novel and improved conflict resolution methods in the form of 
negotiation, bargaining and participatory decision-making structures. 
Weaknesses of the Co-management Approach to the Governance of Common 
Resources 
Alternatively, critics as well as proponents of the co-management approach 
recognize that there are a number of theoretical weaknesses in the application of this 
management system. In a worse case scenario co-management systems may be 
implemented in a coercive way in which local participation is used to legitimize state 
action without any real power sharing taking place. Korten cautions that despite positive 
intentions, state based programs designed to promote community management may 
inadvertently contribute to the process of concentration and marginalization of 
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community interests (Korten, 1986). Likewise, Tsing argues that co-management 
initiatives run the real risk of undermining community autonomy and cosmologies by 
integrating communities into consensus based state led initiatives without any real 
redistribution of power (Tsing, 2005). 
In order to be taken seriously by more powerful actors involved in co-
management processes, Tsing argues that communities face a real risk of losing local 
priorities and local identity. Lemos and Agarwal concur that it is critical to recognize that 
in many cases environmental governance is firmly embedded in the neo liberal political 
economy, and that co-management rhetoric may be co-opted by powerful actors as a 
means for manufacturing consent, and quashing social movements and protests from 
below, while not posing any real challenge to the dominant power's interests (Lemos & 
Agarwal, 2006). 
Lemos and Agarwal also caution that co-management efforts may result in the 
redistribution of responsibility for environmental management without sufficient 
redistribution of power and resources. The mere inclusion of more social actors in 
governance processes does not necessarily correlate with a more democratic system. 
While rhetoric and formal processes may provide the impression that power has been re-
distributed, there is a significant risk that those who are able to exercise more access and 
expertise in relation to the governance mechanisms being employed are likely to derive 
the greatest influence and therefore benefits resulting from them (Lemos & Agarwal, 
2006). 
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Other critics of the co-management approach warn that under the rhetoric of 
participation, critical state responsibilities may be offloaded onto local communities that 
simply don't have the capacity to manage their resources independently. In the case that 
the state deems natural resource management a low priority, the rhetoric of co-
management may be used as a means of justifying minimum common denominator goals, 
and minimum state responsibilities in the conservation efforts (IUCN, 2002). 
Even in the case of the best intentions, the state's capacity to create appropriate 
environmental policies may be undermined by the inclusion of multiple social actors in 
the environmental management system. Further, Lemos and Agarwal warn that co-
management rhetoric may be used as a further justification for the neoliberal project of 
rolling back the state. As environmental decision-making and management power is 
transferred away from the state to both international and local actors, the policy-making 
capacity of the state may be critically undermined, and policy-making goals such as 
environmental conservation and redistribution efforts may become impossible (Lemos & 
Agarwal, 2006). 
Assessing the Need for Co-Management and the Feasibility of the Process 
While the co-management approach to natural resource management has both 
proponents and detractors, most would agree that the success or failure of this approach 
has much to do with its implementation as well as a number of pre-existing factors. 
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The state's participation in a co-management regime is particularly beneficial when: local 
actors have historically held customary and/or legal rights over the resources at stake; 
local interests continue to be significantly impacted by national natural resource 
management decisions; decisions tend to be controversial and different knowledge 
systems, values, and cosmologies need to be accommodated; the prior natural resource 
management system has failed to attain the interests or needs of one or more of the 
institutional actors; the relevant institutional actors are willing to collaborate and finally 
when there is adequate time and resources to design, facilitate and implement the process 
(IUCN, 2002). Alternatively, local communities' participation is especially appropriate 
and beneficial when: powerful new actors are encroaching and undermining traditional 
governance and use of natural resources; and when these customary practices are no 
longer able to manage local resources in a sustainable fashion (IUCN, 2002). 
According to Berkes; "assuming that co-management is desirable and there is a 
need for it, and assuming that devolution of management power is possible and feasible, 
then four key conditions seem to define successful co-management: Are there appropriate 
institutions, both local and governmental? Is there trust between the actors? Is there 
legal protection of local rights? Are there incentives for local communities to conserve 
their resources?" (Berkes, 1997). 
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Chapter 2: Indigenous3 Communities, Traditional Knowledge 
of Agro-Biodiversity 
Abstract: This chapter provides an overview of the relationship between indigenous 
communities, traditional knowledge and agro-biodiversity. In order to examine this 
relationship, traditional uses, conservation methods and community governance 
mechanisms will each be reviewed sequentially. To conclude this section the concept of 
bio-cultural heritage will be introduced to provide a broader and more holistic 
framework, with which to assess the impact of Peruvian national legislation on 
community governance of traditional knowledge and agro-biodiversity. 
Global Importance of Agro-biodiversity and Traditional Knowledge 
Prescribing appropriate policies and practices to halt the erosion of global biodiversity 
including agro-biodiversity is one of the greatest global challenges of our times. The 
genetic diversity that provides the raw materials for humanities' major food crops has 
been declining at an alarming pace, posing a major threat to current and future human 
food supplies. Maintaining agro-biodiversity both within and between crops4 is critical to 
3 According to international criteria, four characteristics distinguish indigenous peoples from others. They 
are descendants of groups inhabiting an area prior to the arrival of other populations: they are politically not 
dominant; they are culturally different from the dominant population; and they identify themselves as 
indigenous" (Berkes, 2001,115). However, according to Soren Hvalkoff, the indigenous peoples of the 
Andean highlands refer to themselves as peasants or campesinos, not indigenous. While referring to 
themselves as campesinos or peasants, they often refer to indigenous peoples of the lowlands as 
"indigenous" and generally perceive them as inferior (Hvalkoff, 2002). So while the term "indigenous" is 
not an unproblematic term to use, it will be used for the purposes of this paper in order to maintain 
consistent language with the national and international legislation being considered as well as the language 
contained in literature surveyed. 
4 Inter-specific agro-biodiversity refers to genetic diversity between different crop species. Intra-specific 
agro-biodiversity refers to genetic diversity within a particular crop species. This paper will consider both 
forms of diversity when using the general term "agro-biodiversity". 
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ensuring global food security. While the impacts of biodiversity erosion are already 
significant, they are likely to become more critical in the face of a changing climate. 
It is not often recognized that peasant farmers and indigenous communities in 
developing countries are responsible for cultivating the majority of the world's agro-
biodiversity. Farmer's continually manage the diversity of their fields by identifying 
desirable crop traits, and encouraging their prevalence and adaptation through selective 
breeding, seed selection and manipulation of growing conditions (Wilkes, 1992 cited 
from Isakson, 2007). In contrast "modern" agricultural practices tend to put a negative 
selection pressure on diversity, as markets are highly dependent on varietal uniformity of 
only a select number of crops for the purposes of profit maximization (Perales, 1998, 
cited from Isakson, 2007). Uniform crops are significantly more vulnerable to epidemics 
and large-scale crop failure; as a result plant breeders must produce new resistant 
varieties every few years. This process of seed regeneration is at least partially 
dependent on traditional agricultural practices and the diversity of agro-biodiversity at the 
local level to provide the raw inputs for commercial seed development (Wilkes, 1992 as 
cited in Isakson, 2007). Thus, agro-biodiversity managed by local and indigenous 
communities is not only important for the maintenance of traditional lifestyles, but also 
provide the backbone for the entire global food supply. 
Only over the past couple of decades has the importance of biodiversity been 
recognized by the international scientific and policy-making community. The major 
38 
reaction has been to develop exsitu gene banks around the world for the conservation of 
those crops that are deemed to be of value to the global food supply (Bellon, 1996). 
Much more recently and to a lesser extent, researchers have begun to recognize the 
importance of insitu conservation, or the conservation of agro-biodiversity within the 
farming systems where they evolved (Brush 1992). In contrast to conservation in gene 
banks, the purpose of insitu conservation is to maintain farmers' traditional knowledge, 
practices and evolutionary processes that have created, adapted and continue to maintain 
diverse agro-ecosystems (Bellon, 1996). Three major justifications are made for the 
importance of insitu conservation efforts. First that on-site conservation is dynamic, 
resulting in an ongoing co-evolutionary process that cannot be replicated in a gene bank. 
Secondly, that insitu conservation is necessary to protect against the fact that ex-situ gene 
banks are subject to human error and reliance on a source of adequate funding. Finally, 
insitu conservation efforts have the distinct advantage that this approach does not 
separate crops and seeds from the invaluable traditional knowledge of those who cultivate 
them (Isakson, 2007). 
Like biological diversity, traditional knowledge systems are invaluable 
repositories of information acquired through cultural evolution processes (Brush, 1996). 
All cultures possess systematic knowledge of the plants, animals and natural phenomena 
in their direct surroundings (Brush, 1996). Unlike traditional knowledge regarding 
undomesticated biodiversity, in the case of agro-biodiversity the relationship is so 
intertwined it becomes impossible to separate the two. The traditional knowledge system 
is so critical to the conservation of agro-biodiversity, that if traditional knowledge about 
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agro-biodiversity is lost, the genetic material will inevitably be lost as well (Argumedo, 
n.d.-a). Local knowledge systems are especially elaborate in those areas containing vast 
amounts of crop biodiversity (Brush, 1996). For example, Quechua farmers in Peru have 
a distinct knowledge system shaping their relationship with agro-biodiversity. For the 
purposes of this paper, biological diversity and traditional knowledge will be considered 
to be integrally related resources. 
Indigenous Communities, Traditional Knowledge and Agro-biodiversity 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the relationship between 
indigenous communities, traditional knowledge and agro-biodiversity. In order to 
examine this relationship, traditional uses, conservation methods, and community 
governance mechanisms of indigenous communities will be reviewed sequentially. To 
conclude this section the concept of bio-cultural heritage will be introduced to provide a 
broader and more holistic framework, with which to assess the impact of Peruvian 
legislation on community governance of agro-biodiversity. However, before proceeding 
with the literature review as outlined above, it is necessary to provide a few caveats 
regarding the risk of generalizations, and reliance on secondary sources to convey the 
views and practices of indigenous communities. 
Generalizations are always problematic, including the tendency of scholars to 
oversimplify and speak of a unified "we" when discussing ideological positions, values 
and cosmologies of cultural groups. Recognizing that the people within each cultural 
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group are complicated, diverse individuals, it should also be assumed that each cultural 
group is made up of a diverse range of perceptions, values and attitudes towards 
environmental conservation (Berkes, 2001). Recognizing that generalizations are risky, 
and should be approached with caution and sensitivity, they are also sometimes useful 
and necessary tools for conceptualizing and analyzing complex issues. 
While this section of the literature review draws upon some good quality 
participatory research projects involving indigenous communities, as well as some 
detailed anthropological studies, it is important to recognize that the intent is not to speak 
on behalf of indigenous communities. Nor is it meant to speak in absolute terms about 
the traditional beliefs, worldviews, and practices of indigenous communities, but rather to 
provide some useful background information and context to begin thinking critically 
about the impact of Peruvian ABS legislation on indigenous communities' governance of 
traditional knowledge and agro-biodiversity. While this literature review will draw upon 
similarities of Quechua indigenous peoples living across the Andes region, as well as 
some useful analyses of governance mechanisms of indigenous communities around the 
world, whenever possible this section will attempt draw on research and findings from 
the Sacred Valley region in Peru where the Potato Park is located. 
About the Region 
In addition to being one of the most biologically diverse countries in the world, 
Peru is home to one of the largest populations of indigenous peoples in the world. The 
majority of Peru's indigenous peoples live in the central and southern Andean regions of 
the country. It is estimated that indigenous peoples make up approximately 43 percent of 
Peru's population (Argumedo, n.d.-a). There are two distinct groups of indigenous 
peoples in Peru, those from the Amazon and a much larger group from the Andes (ibid). 
This paper will largely be drawing on interviews and case studies involving latter. 
For centuries Indigenous communities in the Andes region, have used their 
traditional knowledge of biodiversity, and unique ecosystem, to cultivate an extraordinary 
diversity of crops. Indigenous farmers in this region have shown astonishing capacity for 
agricultural innovation resulting both in the creation of unique food crops as well as 
complex and effective conservation techniques (Argumedo, n.d.-a). More than 10 million 
small-scale farmers of the central Andes of Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia cultivate an 
enormous diversity of crops. It is estimated that up to 40 crops species were 
domesticated in this region prior to the Spanish conquest in the 1500s (Zimmerer, 1996). 
If one considers the diverse varieties of these major Andean crop species, the numbers 
are even more impressive. It is estimated that as many as 5 thousand landraces of 
potatoes and six thousand varieties of maize, continue to be grown by small farmers in 
the region. Many lesser-known varieties of indigenous crops contribute to this diversity. 
These include such crops as Ollucu (Ollucus tuberosus), Oca (Oxalis tuberosa), Mashua 
(Tropucolum aestium), Tarwi (Lupinus mutabilis), Kiwicha (Amarantus caudatus), and 
Quinua (Chenopodium quinoa), as well as many other native horticultural species and 
medicinal plants (Argumedo, n.d.- a). 
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The Sacred Valley region is considered a micro-centre of origin for potatoes as 
well as other important Andean crops (Argumedo, n.d.- a). While approximately 1,300 
different varieties are found in the wider Andean region, this area alone is home to 
approximately 400 wild and cultivated potato varieties (ibid). Approximately 4 million 
indigenous people live in this area the great majority of whom are small-scale subsistence 
farmers. These farmers for the most part farm by hand, or in some cases with oxen 
(Theile, 1999). Most communities in this area maintain strong Quechua cultural 
traditions. The majority continue to speak Quechua and maintain many pre-Hispanic 
cultural traditions, many making their living from traditional farming which to this day 
remains relatively isolated from the global market economy (Argumedo, n.d-a). 
Indigenous Communities and the Use of Traditional Knowledge and Agro-
Biodiversity 
The anthropological literature and case studies reviewed for this section 
demonstrate that agro-biodiversity and related knowledge continue to play two critical 
functions for indigenous communities. First these resources are central to community 
efforts to maintain food security and nutritional needs. At the same time, biodiversity 
maintenance is an essential element of the local peasant economy in the region. 
Growing a range of diverse crops provides an essential buffer against widespread 
crop failure and field losses, due to pests, disease, shortage of rainfall, frost and other 
unforeseen environmental conditions that may differentially impact different crop 
varieties (Zimmerer, 1996). As small farmers are faced with many production risks, the 
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maintenance of crop diversity has been employed as a technique for managing these risks 
(Bellon, 1996). Economics literature on crop diversity has established that the planting 
of crops with variances, minimize farmer risks while maximizing average returns 
(Bellon, 1996). In the absence of pesticides, crop diversity plays an important role in 
reducing the negative impacts of pests and pathogens, as crops are differentially impacted 
and some have developed resistance over a long period of co-evolution (Bellon, 1996). 
Crop diversity and traditional knowledge also provide Quechua subsistence 
farmers with essential nourishment needed for daily survival. For example, the 
consumption of a diverse range of tubers and including potatoes, as well as a variety of 
diverse grains has been the lifeblood of many of these communities. Not only do diverse 
varieties provide essential nutrients, but they also add much needed variety to an 
otherwise monotonous diet, providing different flavours and uses in traditional recipes 
(Bellon, 1996). 
Extraordinary agro-biodiversity, has also allowed these communities to fine-tune 
crops to adapt to different microenvironments or agricultural niches (Zimmerer, 1996). 
Different elevation gradients, a defining characteristic of the landscape of this region, 
result in a variety of microclimates that provide appropriate conditions for unique plant 
communities to flourish. Diverse potato varieties found in the region, are especially 
known for their ability to adapt and vary in accordance with a multitude of ecological 
conditions (Zimmerer, 1996). Each landrace has a different affinity for adaptation and 
success in different growing conditions and tend to be particularly responsive to different 
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soil types (Harlan as cited in Zimmerer, 1996). This unique landscape not only enables 
the cultivation of numerous varieties, but this ability to adapt has been a critical survival 
mechanism for communities in these regions over many generations. 
In addition to providing a broad range of environmental protections, agro-
biodiversity and traditional knowledge also provide the backbone of the Andean 
economy, both informal and formal. Through intricate trading patterns (mainly barter 
markets which exist to this day) indigenous communities from various regions and 
different ecological growing capacities are able to supply one another with diverse crops, 
satisfying gaps in the nutritional basis of individual communities (Theile, 1999). Barter 
markets in this region are vital to ensuring that individual communities have a diverse 
range of food to ensure a balanced diet. For example, long established trading patterns 
dictate that the middle and high agricultural zones will supply starches mainly in the form 
of potatoes and corn, for the rainforest zones, while the rainforest will reciprocate 
providing much needed supplies of vitamin C and potassium through fruits such as citrus 
and bananas (Argumedo, n.d.- a). 
In addition to the exchange of food through the barter system, there is also a 
highly complex and effective informal seed exchange system operating throughout the 
country (Thiele, 1999). Recognizing that seeds from higher areas tend to be of higher 
quality (where degeneration of seed is lower) seed tends to originate from communities at 
the highest altitudes specializing in seed maintenance. Most exchange takes place through 
personal exchange relationships between individuals, neighbours, relatives and nearby 
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communities (Thiele, 1999). The seed is then multiplied and redistributed at an 
intermediate level and further distributed to farmers at a lower level and so on (Thiele, 
1999). Many indigenous farmers rely heavily on agro-biodiversity and traditional 
knowledge not only for meaningful participation in peasant economy but also in some 
cases for participation in specialized global markets (Zimmerer, 1996). 
Text Box One: Market Access and Biodiversity Loss 
Market Access and Biodiversity Loss 
Most theoretical and empirical studies of have shown a positive correlation between 
market access of previously isolated smallholder farmers and biodiversity loss (Isakson, 
2007). The logic predicts that as previously isolated farmers gain greater access to 
markets for their crops, market forces will provide incentives for farmers to reduce their 
production of native varieties, shifting production instead to "improved varieties". 
(Isakson, 2007). This theoretical hypothesis however, is increasingly being called into 
question, as a number of more recent studies have found that market isolation may 
encourage crop diversity in some instances, and discourage it in others (Isakson, 2007). 
While the relationship between farmers' market access and biodiversity conservation 
continues to be debated, it is notable that much of this research fails to disaggregate the 
impacts of farmers" participation in different forms of markets such as small-scale non-
agricultural markets which some studies have found are playing an increasingly 
important role in income generation amongst small-scale farmers (Reardon and German 
Escobar, 2001; Bebbington 1999; Deere, 2004 as cited in Isakson, 2007). 
Cultural and Spiritual Significance of Agro-Biodiversity 
In addition to contributing to the nutritional health and economic livelihoods of 
Peruvian peasant farmers, agro-biodiversity is also of great cultural and spiritual 
significance to many of the country's indigenous communities. Indigenous communities 
tend to place a high emotional and spiritual value on their relationship with diverse 
traditional crops. Indicating this tendency, anthropologists have noted that indigenous 
groups often relate to their animals and plants as if they were persons (Gudeman, 1986). 
For example Zimmerer" s anthropological research in the Paucartambo Andes described 
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the way that indigenous discourse on seed anatomy and disease relies heavily on 
references to the human body (Zimmerer, 1996). Also indicating the degree of cultural 
importance placed on individual crop species, Zimmerer notes that there is no such thing 
as a generic word from "crop" in the Quechua language (Zimmerer, 1996). Instead each 
crop is named independently with great deliberation (Zimmerer, 1996). 
The Quechua discussed their farming with language drawn from an 
immense agricultural vocabulary and a rich array of metaphorical 
and other figurative expressions. The cultivator's artful use of farm 
language created the expressive verbal medium for knowing diverse 
food crops. Less intimate or less plentiful linguistic devices would not 
have so fully accommodated the specialized farm knowledge of the 
Quechua people. It is estimated that one out of every three of four 
Quechua words related to agro-biodiversity lacks an equivalent 
translation in English or Spanish (Zimmerer, 1996, 194). 
Quechua beliefs about proper livelihoods and cuisine indicate a strong cultural preference 
for diverse traditional crops. Consumption patterns and preferences are amongst the most 
important factors driving the continued use and thus, preservation of diverse crops 
(Zimmerer, 1996). Quechua farmers traditionally, produce much of their own food, and 
thus their growing patterns correspond with their culinary tastes and preferences 
(Zimmerer, 1996). A concept known as kawsay is used to express and encourage 
adherence and continuation of traditional community culinary norms. Given the 
correspondence between growing patterns and culinary norms, kawsay also serves 
secondarily as a resource ethic (Zimmerer, 1996). 
Beyond its deep cultural importance, valuation of agro-biodiversity is also 
intricately interwoven into Quechua spiritual and religious beliefs and practices. 
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Traditional religious and spiritual beliefs of the Quechua place great importance on the 
connection of humans with nature, including sacred crops. Through the use of 
emotionally powerful cultural symbols, indigenous communities maintain a sense of 
sacredness and respect for their diverse resources (Berkes, 2001). Religious customs and 
ceremonies of the Quechua in the Andes make use of specific crop types in rituals and 
other religious practices (Zimmerer, 1996). Because of the spiritual significance of 
certain diverse crops, Quechua farmers are required to handle crops in accordance with 
cultural and moral guidelines set out by their communities (Zimmerer, 1996). Zimmerer 
reports that certain traditional crops are known to evoke a sense of connection with 
community ancestors who were also responsible for adapting and maintaining these 
crops. The cultural practice of developing and preserving Sacred Groves provides further 
indication of the sacredness of bio-diverse resources (Argumedo, no date a, 6). 
Indigenous Communities and the Conservation of Biodiversity and Traditional 
Knowledge 
A common perception is that a spirit of stewardship and conservation is 
entrenched in the culture of the Andes. While indigenous communities living in the 
Andes have been successful in the development and maintenance of diverse crops, 
authors such as Berkes caution against fixing to extreme views and over-generalized 
assumptions about indigenous communities and their relationship with the natural 
environment. Caution is particularly necessary to avoid stereotypical depictions of 
indigenous communities as peoples who live in complete harmony with their 
surroundings (Berkes, 2001). At another dangerous extreme is the view that indigenous 
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peoples are incapable and unwilling to manage their natural environments (Berkes, 
2001). Instead, offers Berkes, it is important to view traditional conservation approaches 
as a set of adaptive responses resulting from multiple causes and conditions over time 
(Berkes, 2001). Indigenous peoples just like all other societies, acquire knowledge about 
how the world behaves, and apply this knowledge to guide their everyday life. Because 
indigenous people have been extremely reliant on the natural resources in their immediate 
vicinity for their survival, there has been a constant and strong incentive to develop 
practices to maintain and conserve these resources. 
This tendency is especially true, when it comes to the preservation of local 
biodiversity. For centuries, many of these communities have felt strong incentives to 
maintain these resources, and as a result of their value in everyday life, complex and 
efficient conservation techniques have been developed and practiced (Berkes, 2001). 
According to Berkes, the main reason that biodiversity has been conserved at all over the 
centuries, is because of traditional systems of governance (Berkes, 2001). In the 
Paucartambo Andes, as well as other central Andean traditional governance mechanisms 
for the conservation of biodiversity date back to as many as 7000 years ago and have 
evolved alongside the agro-biodiversity that is being grown today (Zimmerer, 1996). 
Indigenous Communities and the Traditional Governance of Biodiversity and 
Traditional Knowledge 
Generally speaking, Andean customary governance mechanisms provide the 
basis for many patterns of conduct by which community members adhere (IIED, n.d.- b). 
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More specifically, community customary governance mechanims5 govern the way that 
agro-biodiversity and its associated knowledge are acquired, shared, conserved, and used. 
Customary laws vary across place and time, and adapt in response to the conditions and 
needs of individual communities (IIED, n.d.-b). While some customary laws are 
codified, or incorporated into local legislation, for the most part these rules and norms are 
orally held and transmitted from generation to generation (ibid). While there is variance 
amongst and between individual communities, some similarities can be found within the 
customary laws of most Andean Quechua communities. 
Almost all Quechua communities share the guiding principles of reciprocity, duality, and 
equilibrium (IIED, n.d-b). Reciprocity is the belief that what has been received must be 
given back in equal measure. The principle of duality holds that everything has an 
opposite, which complements it. This translates into a variety of ethical beliefs including 
that human behaviour should not be individualistic (ibid). Finally, the principle of 
equilibrium refers to balance and harmony in all aspects of life including interactions 
with the natural environment. Customary laws relating to the management of 
biodiversity are largely derived from the above-mentioned principles. 
Many indigenous communities, and NGOs have pointed out the failure of many existing 
international and national policy and legislation to consider indigenous customary laws in 
the formulation of formal laws and to integrate indigenous governance mechanisms into 
the larger system of governance (Argumedo, n.d.- b). 
Customary governance refers to "locally recognized principles or systems applied to internally govern or 
guide aspects of the lives and activities of indigenous and local communities, which are orally held and 
transmitted and applied to community institutions, and which include specific norms or rules for the 
management of particular resources or conflicts " (iied et. al, n.d.-a, 4). 
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Collective Bio-Cultural Heritage of Indigenous Communities 
The purpose of this chapter was to understand the relationship between 
indigenous communities and agro-biodiversity and related traditional knowledge and to 
provide an introduction to the traditional governance of these resources. Recognizing the 
interconnection of these resources with the physical survival, as well as with the cultural 
and religious views of Andean indigenous communities, it is argued by some that any 
effort to protect the agro-biodiversity and traditional knowledge of indigenous 
communities must be done in a holistic manner founded on an understanding and respect 
for the distinct cultural, biological, and ecological nature of indigenous communities 
(IIED, n.d.-a). 
The International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), together 
with a number of indigenous groups including Association ANDES have developed the 
concept of Collective Bio-Cultural Heritage as a holistic framework within which a 
community's knowledge and resources are embedded. As defined by the workshop; 
Collective Bio-cultural Heritage (is a concept that refers to the) 
knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous peoples and local 
communities which are often held collectively and inextricably linked to 
traditional resources and territories; including the diversity of genes, 
varieties, species and ecosystems; cultural and spiritual values; and 
customary laws shaped within the socio-ecological context of communities 
(IIED, n.d.-a, 4). 
According to the participant organizations in this study, the components of 
Collective Bio-cultural Heritage including agro-biodiversity are inextricably linked, and 
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therefore the conservation of one component can only be maintained as a part of this 
holistic system including the indigenous cosmo-vision or holistic worldview (IIED, n.d.-
a). In other words, maintenance of traditional agro-biodiversity requires a holistic 
conservation approach simultaneously addressing the conservation of cultural, spiritual, 
biological, and landscapes of indigenous communities (IIED, n.d.-a). 
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Chapter 3- Exploring the Compatibility of Peruvian ABS 
Legislation and Community sui generis Governance of Agro-
biodiversity and Traditional Knowledge 
Abstract: This chapter introduces the origin of the International Debate on Access and 
Benefit Sharing. An overview of the Convention on Biological Diversity is then 
presented, as well as an introduction to the Peruvian Law for the Protection of 
Traditional Knowledge which was highly influenced by Peru's signing of the Convention. 
These international and national regimes for Access and Benefit Sharing are then 
contrasted with traditional governance mechanisms of Andean communities, drawing on 
the example of the communities of the ANDES Potato Park. 
Origins of the International Debate on Access and Benefit Sharing 
For hundreds of years, traditional knowledge and genetic resources were 
considered the common heritage of humankind, freely transferable across borders without 
consent from the country of origin and without any obligation to share the benefits 
resulting from their use. Developing countries have always been and are still the source 
of the majority of the world's valuable traditional knowledge and biodiversity (Brush, 
1992). The areas of origin of almost all modern crop varieties are for the most part 
located in the least developed countries, and based upon the traditional knowledge of the 
traditional farming communities that exist in these localities (Brush, 1992). For example 
the historical centre of origin for wheat is in Turkey, Iraq and Syria, for rice is India, 
China, Thailand and the Philippines, for maize Mexico and Guatemala, and finally for 
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potatoes the Peruvian slopes of the Andes (Vavilov, 1992). The commercial 
development of these modern crops has been dependent on the uncompensated collection 
of crop genetic specimens from these and other centers of origin, which are then used in 
formal crop breeding programs. 
Over centuries the farmers of least developed countries have been primarily 
responsible for the adaptation and maintenance of the local varieties upon which the 
global food system is based (Brush, 1992). Because biodiversity is primarily 
concentrated in areas populated by indigenous and local communities (Ruiz et al, 2004), 
these communities are vital to the study, use and preservation of biological diversity and 
traditional knowledge. At the same time the culture, livelihoods and well being of these 
communities are also intrinsically linked to these resources (ibid). While the genetic 
resources and traditional knowledge of developing countries have been dispersed freely 
around the world for centuries, the issue has become increasingly controversial over the 
last several decades. These least developed countries are increasingly seeking greater 
control and respect for farmers' rights over their crop genetic resources in response to 
recent international developments including the granting of intellectual property rights, 
the rise in prominence of the biotechnology industry, and finally because of the perceived 
erosion of genetic diversity in these regions (Brush, 1992). 
Sentiments on the sharing of genetic resources have become increasingly divided 
along the lines of developed and developing countries, as plant breeders in developed 
countries have been granted intellectual property rights over improved varieties of plants. 
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At this point it is mainly developed countries that recognize and enforce plant breeders' 
rights; however the international community is now trying to extend these provisions to 
developing countries (Brush, 1992). Under these intellectual property regimes biological 
resources can be considered private intellectual property through the granting of patents. 
This creates the ironic situation, where farmers in the poorest countries where the vast 
majority of valuable genetic materials originate, end up paying plant breeders in 
developed countries for the use of genetic materials that were developed from the 
uncompensated use of local varieties (Brash, 1992). As developed countries continue to 
recognize the enormous economic potential of the biotech industry, the push towards 
enforcing plant breeder's rights and intellectual property rights over genetic materials has 
gathered steam. At the same time developed countries continue to demonstrate a renewed 
and heightened interest in ensuring continued access to genetic resources and traditional 
knowledge of the South, as these resources provide essential inputs for technology 
development. 
Developing countries, have for the most part opposed the granting of plant 
breeders rights, instead lobbying for farmer's rights based upon the arguments that either 
all germplasm should be considered the common heritage of humankind, or that 
traditional plant cultivators in developing countries should share in the benefits gained 
from using their genetic resources (Brush, 1992). Also, as the Northern demand for 
genetic resources and traditional knowledge increased, biopiracy6 became a more 
significant threat. Addressing these concerns, the Convention on Biological Diversity 
6 Biopiracy is commonly referred to as the appropriation of the knowledge or genetic resources of 
indigenous or local communities by external actors seeking exclusive monopoly control over these 
resources usually in the form of patents or plant breeders' rights (ETC Group, 2008). 
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(CBD) became the first International Agreement regulating the access and benefit sharing 
of traditional knowledge and genetic resources. 
International Access and Benefit Sharing Legislation: Convention on Biological 
Diversity 
The Convention on Biological Diversity was adopted at the Earth Summit in 
1992. The stated objective of the convention is to promote the conservation of biological 
diversity, the sustainable use of its components, and the fair and equitable sharing of the 
benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources (CBD, 1992). The signing of 
the CBD was monumental in that it reversed hundreds of years of free and unregulated 
access to traditional knowledge and genetic resources. The Convention declared that the 
nation state was the legal owner of all genetic resources contained within its boundaries. 
The state would thus have sovereign authority to regulate access and benefit sharing of 
genetic resources (CBD, 1992). 
The logic behind the Convention was that sharing financial benefits with 
countries that provide genetic resources would offer these countries an economic 
incentive to conserve these resources for the benefit of (hu)mankind. The Convention 
was meant to address the tension between developed and developing countries by 
strengthening the South's efforts to conserve the majority of the world's biodiversity 
(contained within their borders), and to have Northern countries share in the costs and 
benefits resulting from these conservation efforts (Zedan, 2005). 
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The Convention contained a special provision related to the protection and conservation 
of traditional knowledge. Article 8j of the convention requires that signatory countries 
(CBD, 1992): 
• Respect, preserve and maintain the knowledge, innovation and practices of 
indigenous and local communities related to the conservation and sustainable use 
of biodiversity; 
• Promote the wider application of Traditional Knowledge with the approval and 
involvement of the holders of such knowledge; and 
• Encourage the equitable sharing of benefits derived from the use of such 
knowledge, innovations and practices. 
While the Convention does establish principles of respect and equity with regards 
to the traditional knowledge of indigenous peoples, it falls short of creating a property 
right for indigenous peoples over their knowledge (Tobin & Swiderska, 2001). Further, 
the Convention is unclear as to how this will affect the rights, practices and the ability of 
communities to govern genetic resources. There is no doubt that the CBD will have 
profound implications (both intended and unintended) and offers tremendous 
opportunities and risks for nations, communities and individuals. However, many of 
these outcomes and impacts will be unpredictable, highly debated amongst stakeholders, 
and dependant on how these international guidelines are transferred into national 
legislation. 
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Peruvian ABS Legislation: The Law for the Protection of Collective Knowledge of 
Indigenous Peoples 
Peru is considered to be a mega diverse country due to its extremely high level of 
biodiversity. It is estimated that Peru is home to over 4,000 medicinal plants and 130 
native crop species (Ruiz et al, 2004). In addition to its tremendous biodiversity, there 
are 44 cultural and ethnic indigenous groups located for the most part in the Andean and 
Amazonian regions of the country (ibid). Many of these ethnic and cultural groups have 
been recognized for their use of traditional knowledge in cultivating and conserving a 
wide variety of crops. 
A signatory to the CBD, in 2002 Peru formally introduced law 27811 for the 
"Protection of the Collective Knowledge of Indigenous Peoples" . This national sui 
generis legislation is the first legal regime in the world intended specifically to protect 
the traditional knowledge of indigenous peoples (Ruiz et al, 2004). The law defines 
traditional knowledge as "the accumulated, transgenerational knowledge evolved by 
indigenous peoples and communities concerning the properties, uses and characteristics 
of biological diversity" (Law 27811, 2002, article 2). 
The declared objectives of this law are to: protect, preserve and develop collective 
knowledge; to ensure fair and equitable distribution of benefits derived from the use of 
collective knowledge; to use collective knowledge to benefit indigenous peoples and 
humankind; to assure that any use of collective knowledge requires the prior informed 
7 A copy of the Law 27811 is contained in the appendix of this paper. 
8 Legislation that is "of one's own kind", that is not derived from or based on any existing legislation such as national 
or international ABS legislation or intellectual property rights. 
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consent of indigenous peoples; to promote indigenous capacity to distribute collectively 
generated benefits; and finally to prevent patents on inventions based on the collective 
knowledge of indigenous peoples without proper consent (Law 27811, 2002). 
In order to meet these broad objectives the following principles were established. 
Prior informed consent is required from the relevant community or peoples before 
collective traditional knowledge can be used for scientific, industrial or commercial 
purposes. The law stipulates that present generations of indigenous communities are 
responsible for preserving, developing and administering collective traditional knowledge 
for their own benefit and that of future generations. Finally protection under the law 
applies only to traditional knowledge belonging collectively to one or more indigenous 
peoples, but not that belonging to individual members. Collective traditional knowledge 
is regarded as part of the cultural heritage of the indigenous peoples (WIPO, 2000). 
An indigenous community in possession of collective traditional knowledge is 
legally protected against any unauthorized or unfair disclosure, acquisition or use of that 
knowledge, insofar as such traditional knowledge is not in the public domain. This 
protection extends to third parties having obtained the information under obligation of 
confidentiality (WIPO, 2000). In the case that community's rights to traditional 
knowledge are infringed; the law permits Indigenous communities to take legal action 
where the burden of proof will be placed on the defendant (WIPO, 2000). 
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Several mechanisms for protecting indigenous rights to traditional knowledge are utilized 
in the law. It is proposed that a national system of registers should be established offering 
varying levels of confidentiality (Ruiz et al, 2004). These registers are intended to 
provide both defensive protection against outside patents aiding in prior art search 
requests, while at the same time offering positive protection facilitating the maintenance 
and transmission of indigenous peoples' knowledge. The law therefore proposes three 
different types of registers: a Public National Register; a Confidential National Register; 
and Local Registers. The former would be implemented by INDECOPI and would 
inform patent granting decision-making. The Private National Register would be used 
for the same purpose but would provide indigenous communities with the ability to 
choose to keep some information strictly confidential and inaccessible by third parties. 
Finally, local registers are proposed as local initiatives to document and maintain control 
of collective knowledge of each community (Ruiz et al, 2004). 
Licensing contracts are also relied on heavily in this national effort to protect 
traditional knowledge. Specifically, they are promoted in the legislation as an effective 
mechanism for ensuring that fees and royalties are paid to indigenous communities for 
the use of their collective traditional knowledge (WIPO, 2000). The law sets out a 
framework of rules and regulations for negotiations with indigenous communities, when 
third parties are seeking access to traditional knowledge and genetic resources. 
Applications for licences would be overseen by INDECOPI and would be mandatory and 
subject to minimum requirements. Communities would be free to enter into an 
agreement individually for knowledge that is shared with other communities, but their 
9 INDECOPI is the Peruvian National Institute for the Defense of Competition and Intellectual Property 
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agreement would not preclude other communities possessing the same resources from 
entering into a similar agreement (Ruiz et al, 2004). 
Licensing contracts would require the prior informed consent of indigenous 
peoples. The law has established that prior informed consent for the access and use of 
traditional knowledge by a third party will not be granted by communities themselves, 
but by representative organizations of indigenous peoples. The rationale is that since 
many communities share common knowledge and genetic resources and may have 
divergent views regarding outsider use of these resources. Therefore representative 
organizations are relied upon in order to make decisions on behalf of communities and to 
reduce conflict over shared resources (Ruiz et al, 2004). 
Finally, the Law establishes a Fund for the Development of Indigenous Peoples. 
The Fund would receive payments from the state, international bio-prospecting 
agreements, and a percentage of the profits obtained from inventions and technologies 
based on community traditional knowledge. The money would be used toward the 
overall development of indigenous peoples by financing projects and activities (WIPO, 
2000). 
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Customary Governance Mechanisms in Peru 
It is important to understand not only how national ABS legislation protects 
traditional knowledge but also to reflect upon how this legislation will impact customary 
practices and the customary laws of traditional communities. In order to address this 
concern a small number of traditional communities have begun to formalize local sui 
generis governance mechanisms. Advocates of this approach argue that sui generis 
systems should not be based on formal or Western intellectual property models focused 
on protecting individual rights, and commercial incentives, but instead they should reflect 
the knowledge systems, innovative processes, customary governance mechanisms of 
traditional communities themselves (Swiderska, 2006). 
Swiderska argues that communities must protect their rights to their knowledge at 
the local level. From this perspective it is through strong local governance mechanisms 
that communities will remain in control of their natural resources, maintain their 
biodiversity and traditional knowledge and at the same time improve their livelihoods 
(Swiderska, 2006). However useful this may be, Tobin points out that in cases where 
customary law and domestic laws conflict, it is most often the formal national law that 
dictates policy and practice (Tobin, n.d.-a). He proposes that the interface between 
community governance mechanisms and national policies must be examined in order to 
understand how both of these governance mechanisms may simultaneously support 
protection of traditional knowledge within the larger framework of community 
Customary governance refers to the traditional mechanisms for making community decisions. Such mechanisms are 
based on indigenous cultural and spiritual beliefs, have evolved over centuries and are passed down from generation to 
generation. Customary governance mechanisms are used to make decisions at the community level regarding the 
preservation, use, exchange and innovation of genetic resources and traditional knowledge. 
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biocultural heritage . In other words, how can customary laws be used to shape the 
development and implementation of National ABS legislation? 
ANDES NGO and the Potato Park 
The Potato Park, located outside of Cusco, Peru reflects a sui generis regime as 
described above. The Potato Park is an agricultural collective that was developed in 2002 
under the coordination of ANDES NGO. ANDES is a locally based NGO that facilitates 
the efforts of indigenous communities to develop innovative landscape-based 
conservation models, based on traditional management practices and indigenous 
knowledge, and to formalize these methods through sui generis legislation. 
The Potato Park brings together six Quechua settlements for the purpose of 
establishing a preserve where Quechua crops coveted by outsiders could be protected 
from threats of biopiracy, conserved, exchanged and developed according to customary 
law. The Park's Council has regulatory control over the genetic diversity in the park, and 
are in the process of developing sui generis governance mechanisms based on customary 
law to govern the conservation of Andean biodiversity and ecosystems and Quechua 
culture, including the access and benefit sharing of genetic resources and traditional 
knowledge (Koerner, 2007). 
11 As discussed in the previous chapter, Biocultural Heritage is defined as " knowledge, innovations, and practices of 
indigenous peoples and local communities which are collectively held and inextricably linked to traditional resources 
and territories; including the variety of genes, varieties, species and ecosystems; cultural and spiritual values; and 
customary laws shaped within the socio-ecological context of communities" (Swiderska, 2006). 
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For centuries the communities of the Potato Park, as well as many other 
indigenous communities, have been adapting to new challenges and opportunities to 
maintain the biocultural heritage of the region. Quechua values provide the framework 
for the Park's approach to protecting the communities' biocultural heritage. Three values 
in particular are guiding the development and implementation of the local governance 
mechanism: these are the same Quechua values reviewed in the previous section of the 
literature review: reciprocity12, equilibrium13, and duality14 (Argumedo, n.d.). 
A number of activities have taken place to date to develop and implement a sui 
generis regime reflecting current conditions, and drawing on the principles of traditional 
customary law within the Potato Park. These include the signing of a historic agreement 
with the International Potato Centre (CIP) for the repatriation of native crops; the 
ongoing development of an inter-community agreement for equitable benefit sharing; and 
finally the development of a community register to provide both positive and defensive 
protection for community resources. The sui generis system aims to be holistic in its 
approach, in that it seeks to protect the biocultural heritage of the communities, including 
not only biodiversity and traditional knowledge, but also the right to continued 
community management. 
Reciprocity: what is received must be given back in equal measure. It encompasses the principle of equity, and 
provides the basis for negotiation and exchange between humans, and with Mother Earth. 
13 Duality: everything has an opposite which complements it; behaviour cannot be individualistic, for example, in the 
union between man and woman; and that other systems or paradigms can be used. 
14 Equilibrium: refers to balance and harmony, in both nature and society- (e.g. respect for the nature and mountain 
gods; resolving conflicts to restore social harmony; and complementarity e.g. between ecological niches). 
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Argumedo describes the customary legal system operating in the communities of 
the Potato Park focusing on the principles governing property law, community decision 
making structures, traditional mechanisms governing access to community resources and 
finally traditional mechanisms regulating benefit sharing (Argumedo, n.d.-a). Property 
within the communities of the Potato Park is owned and managed collectively (ibid). 
Land, can be owned collectively by the entire community, or for a set amount of time 
within a particular family. Property rights are designed so that the entire community 
owns, conserves, uses and benefits from community land, and entire families own, 
conserve, use and benefit from land held collectively by families (ibid). The landscape of 
the Potato Park, is a collective entity, including its biogenetic diversity, ecosystem goods, 
cultural and spiritual values, knowledge, practices and innovations that determine which 
crops are cultivated and how they are managed are all held collectively as well. 
Decision-making in the communities of the Potato Park is carried out in a 
collective fashion by "varyocs15" (ibid). The cultural values that support the political and 
social functions of the Potato Park emphasize the importance of including all community 
members in decision-making processes. Through collective decision-making structures, 
and the continued reverence for traditional institutions and authorities, cultural values 
continue to dictate how knowledge, land and genetic resources are managed. 
Access to biological resources and traditional knowledge is open, and governed 
by customary laws related to resource conservation and use. As a result, all aspects of 
communities' bio-cultural heritage, whether biological or spiritual, are openly available 
15 Quechua traditional authorities 
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to be shared, used and appreciated by all of humanity. In the communities of the Potato 
Park this often occurs through the sharing of resources and knowledge amongst kinship 
networks. While access is generally open, there are some restrictions imposed by 
customary laws that require recipients to ensure that access will remain open and to use 
those resources in a way that respects the biological and cultural integrity of the 
community of origin. The Andean principal of reciprocity guides the formation of 
reciprocal relations between resource provider and resource user. 
Finally, benefit sharing is also conditioned by community customary principles of 
resource conservation and use. Within the Potato Park, all community members benefit 
from daily use of traditional resources including biodiversity, cultural and spiritual 
values, customary laws, traditional knowledge and land. Benefit sharing of these 
resources requires that recipients must conserve these resources and use them sustainably. 
Collective benefit sharing is dependent upon egalitarian political and social relations and 
Andean principles of reciprocity and equilibrium (ibid). 
In summary, the communities of the Potato Park will make a very interesting case 
study as the communities are in the process of developing a sui generis system for access 
and benefit sharing that draws upon the customary legal tools, institutions, principles and 
mechanisms of the communities. At the same time, the sui generis system is being 
developed in reaction to global and national changes in the governance of biodiversity 
and traditional knowledge as well as the perceived threat of biopiracy. As Peru is now in 
the process of adapting and implementing the Law for the Protection of Traditional 
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Knowledge, it is of critical importance to understand how this law will impact customary 
legal regimes of Andean communities to continue to protect their bio-cultural heritage. 
Chapter 4- Methodology 
Abstract: This chapter reintroduces the research questions that are the focus of this 
research project. A hypothesis is then developed, followed by an overview of the multi-
level governance framework that was used to design the methodology, which comprises 
the final section of this chapter. 
In order to understand the compatibility of the Peruvian Law for the Protection of 
Traditional Knowledge and the customary governance mechanisms of the ANDES Potato 
Park, this research project focuses upon three key research questions. 
Research Questions 
• In what ways does the Peruvian law for the Protection of Traditional Knowledge 
create opportunities to strengthen customary governance mechanisms of the 
ANDES Potato Park to manage traditional knowledge and associated 
biodiversity? 
• In what ways does the Peruvian Law for the Protection of Traditional Knowledge 
threaten the ability of customary governance mechanisms of the ANDES Potato 
Park to manage traditional knowledge and associated biodiversity? 
• How could this compatibility of the Law for the Protection of Traditional 




The Law for the Protection of Traditional Knowledge can be implemented in a way that 
respects traditional governance mechanisms of Andean communities while at the same 
time recognizes and reflects international obligations of the state. 
Theoretical Framework 
These research questions will be addressed through a qualitative, case study 
approach, investigating multi-level governance of environmental resources. A multi-
level governance approach was chosen to investigate how changes in biodiversity 
governance occurring at the international level and national level will impact local 
governance mechanisms. In other words this research project was designed to investigate 
how the Peruvian Law for the Protection of Traditional Knowledge, shaped by the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, will impact customary governance mechanisms of 
the communities of the Potato Park. As broad sweeping changes in environmental 
governance are taking place at the international level, it is becoming increasingly 
important, not only to investigate how this legislation will manifest at the national level 
but also how this resulting legislation will impact communities: those people who are 
most reliant upon biodiversity and traditional knowledge and at the same time most relied 
upon for the conservation and maintenance of these resources. It is well known that 
indigenous communities in Peru had very little involvement in the development of the 
Law for the Protection of Traditional Knowledge, so the purpose of this study is to gather 
the perspectives of those involved in the development of the law (policy makers and legal 
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experts) as well as those who are intended to benefit from the law (a grass roots NGO and 
a collective of indigenous communities in Peru). The findings of this case study will then 
be analyzed in correspondence with the theories of environmental ownership/multi-level 
governance as presented in the first chapter of the literature review to provide 
recommendations as to how the multi-level governance of these resources could be 
improved. 
These research questions were investigated and analyzed within a multi-level 
governance framework from two broad perspectives: First from the perspective of 
national policy makers and legal experts involved in the development of this law; and 
secondly from the perspective of a grassroots NGO and community representatives who 
are developing and adapting local governance mechanisms to address many of the same 
issues. To add further depth to my research, additional interviews were held with experts 
in the field of biodiversity and traditional knowledge in Peru. These interviews will not 
be used in the analysis of the data collected, but rather to provide useful background 
information that will inform the analysis and discussion of the data 
The Potato Park and ANDES NGO were chosen for this in-depth case study 
because ANDES and the communities of the Potato Park are currently working together 
to develop local a sui generis governance regime based on customary governance 
mechanisms to protect their knowledge and resources. The communities of the Potato 
Park are one of the only groups identified in the literature who are applying their 
customary governance mechanisms to address changes in the governance of biodiversity 
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and traditional knowledge at the national and international levels. Because the literature 
established that the communities of the Potato Park were working with ANDES in a 
participatory fashion to develop sui generis governance mechanisms based on customary 
law, it was assumed that there would be a generalized awareness of the issues within the 
communities upon which this study could draw. It is important to note that while the 
Potato Park may not be representative of other communities in Peru, it provides an 
extremely useful example through which to compare the compatibility of local and 
national and international governance mechanisms. 
A qualitative approach was designed to allow for a detailed, personal and nuanced 
understanding of how national ABS policy will impact local community governance 
mechanisms. It is important to understand in great detail why this law was designed the 
way it is, the intentions of the law, and the views of individual policy makers and legal 
experts. For this reason qualitative interviews were selected as the most appropriate 
method for attaining this information from policy makers, legal experts and the 
employees of ANDES NGO. Work with the Potato Park was also qualitative in nature. 
It was designed in collaboration with ANDES staff and community members to be 
participatory and community led. Focus groups and community assemblies were held, in 
adherence with community norms and values in order to obtain detailed information 
about the views, principles and perspectives of community members. 
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Methodology: 
Stage One: Policy Makers and Legal Experts 
The first set of interviews were conducted in Lima with individuals who were 
involved in the development of the Law for the Protection of Traditional Knowledge, 
and/or are currently involved in the implementation of its principles, and/or have 
significant expertise regarding this piece of legislation. The purpose of these interviews 
was to understand: 1) how these individuals interpret the strengths and weaknesses of this 
law; 2) how these strengths and weaknesses are likely to impact customary governance 
mechanisms, and lastly; 3) how this law might be adapted or implemented to be more 
compatible with local systems of governance. 
Semi-structured, open-ended interviews were held with eight individuals. 
Six of these individuals were participants in the Working Group on Traditional 
Knowledge. This working group consisted of various stakeholders who had been 
involved to various degrees in the development of the Law for the Protection of 
Traditional Knowledge. Interviewees represented various institutions including the 
National Institute for Natural Resources (INIA), the Peruvian Environmental Law 
Society (SPDA), and the International Potato Centre (CIP) and the National Commission 
against Biopiracy. 
Stage Two: ANDES NGO, and Community Representatives of the Potato Park 
The second stage of data collection approached the same basic questions from the 
perspective of representatives of a grassroots NGO, and the six communities of the Potato 
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Park. The purpose was to understand: 1) customary approaches to governing traditional 
knowledge and genetic resources; 2) how the Law for the Protection of Traditional 
knowledge is likely to strengthen or weaken these approaches; and 3) what could be done 
to make the two systems of governance more compatible. 
Semi-structured, open-ended interviews were conducted with the director and a 
senior staff member of ANDES NGO. Following community norms, data collection with 
community members was participatory in nature including one focus group, and two 
community assembly meetings. After establishing contact with the director of ANDES 
NGO, it was suggested that I visit the communities of the Potato Park to discuss the 
intentions of my project. Along with NGO staff members and translators I appeared 
before the Potato Park general assembly (consisting of one leader from each of the six 
communities representing the community to the Potato Park) to present the intention of 
my research project. Community members discussed the merits of permitting community 
participation in my study and decided that this project may provide good exposure for 
their tourism program since I would be presenting my research in Canada as well as in 
other International settings. 
The community assembly then decided in adherence with community norms, that 
the research project would be participatory in nature. It was decided that the first step 
would be to organize a focus group meeting in which the Potato Park leaders (one from 
each community calling themselves "barefoot technicians") would travel to Cusco for 
one day to learn about the Law for the Protection of Traditional Knowledge and to 
discuss my research questions. Following this meeting with the barefoot technicians, a 
larger community assembly meeting would be arranged in the Potato Park. 
Following the focus group with the barefoot technicians, it was decided that the 
community assembly meeting would be facilitated by the barefoot technicians who would 
engage community leaders and relevant individuals in a discussion of my research 
questions. The meeting was held in the largest structure in the Potato Park, and brought 
together approximately 35 people. In attendance were the presidents of each community, 
the traditional leaders of each community, a women's medicinal plants collective, a 
women's artisans collective, as well as the barefoot technician from each community. 
NGO staff and translators were also in attendance for facilitation and translation 
purposes. At the community assembly I presented my research intentions and attained 
approval to meet with the assembly. After permission was granted community members 
broke into small groups to discuss my research questions. Once each of the groups had 
reached consensus, and formulated answers, the groups then came back together to 
present their responses to each of the questions. Each question was then presented to the 
entire group, who reached consensus on each question, which were presented to me 
orally, as well as on paper. 
Ethical Considerations: 
This research was designed to adhere to the guiding principles of the Canadian 
Tri-Council Policy Statement: the respect for human dignity; the respect for free and 
informed consent; respect for vulnerable persons; the respect for privacy and 
confidentiality; respect for justice and inclusiveness; minimizing harm and finally 
maximizing benefit. 
Prior informed consent was required from all participants prior to participation in 
the study. Interviewees were informed that there is no obligation to participate in the 
study and that they are free to leave at any point16. In the case of individual interviews, a 
consent form was provided and permission was granted in writing. In the case of focus 
group participation, and participation in the community assembly meeting consent was 
granted orally. This is justified because of cultural sensitivities regarding legal 
documents, a low literacy rate in the community, as well as language barriers. 
It is expected that foreseeable benefits outweigh the risks associated with 
participating in this study. While there are numerous competing views on the issues 
being studied, there is already a lot of public discussion taking place on this issue. 
Participants will benefit from the ability to express their point of view, and/or the ability 
to engage in a dialogue about policies that impact them. Community members were 
pleased to hear that through the dissemination of research results, greater awareness of 
the Potato Park may be raised. 
Prior to fieldwork this research project was approved by the Ethics Board at Saint Mary's 
University. 
16 Please see Appendix C for a cop y of the Consent Form 
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Chapter 5- Findings 
Abstract: Interviews and/or focus groups were carried out with three groups of 
informants: employees of ANDES NGO, members of the communities of the Potato Park 
and finally legal experts and policy makers involved in the development of the Law for 
the Protection of Traditional Knowledge. In the beginning of this chapter, a chart is 
presented which outlines the major views put forward by each of the informant groups. 
Following the chart, the perspective of each group will be summarized in detail. In the 
next chapter these findings will be analyzed as they relate to the major research 
questions that are the focus of this research project. 
Table 2: Findings 










Allow communities to 
maintain equilibrium 
Allow communities to 
benefit from positive 
aspects of 
globalization and 
resist negative ones 





The law is not likely to 
strengthen customary 
governance mechanisms 
How is this law likely 




The law does not 
correlate with 
communities' view of 
"protection" 
The law fails to protect 
the complex systems at 
the local level in which 
these resources are 
embedded 
Overly focused on 
protecting these 
resources as commercial 
products 
How can the 
compatibility of 
the two legal 
regimes be 
improved? 
Top down nature of 
policy making should 
be reversed 
External actors 
should recognize that 
communities are rich 
in their own 
capacities to govern 
their resources 
External actors need 
to appreciate the local 
vision of the world 
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Allows communities 
to remain flexible and 
dynamic over time 




The problem begins at 
The International level, 
with the misguided 
approach of The CBD 
The process has been 
imposed from the top 




lack of respect for 
indigenous peoples 
Community 
development of a sui 
generis system for 







support for this sui 
generis system 
Possibility of 
emerging Potential to 
work with the local 
and regional 
governments 
Need to build bridges 
with the state political 
and economic 
processes in order to 
avoid conflict and 
total integration. 






Central to the 
preservation of way of 
life 










developing local registries 
which are also proposed 
and supported by the law 
On the whole, community 
members were skeptical 
about the intentions and 
impacts of the law 
How is this law likely 




Deep suspicion of state-
led conservation projects 
Scope of the law is far 
too narrow 
How can the 
compatibility of 
the two legal 
regimes be 
improved? 
Much of the 
responsibility for the 
conservation of these 
resources falls within 
the community itself 
Efforts should be 
made to strengthen 
internal governance 







that their resources 
are not overly 
exploited and are 
conserved for future 
generations 
The effort to prevent 
biopiracy will require 
external support 
Does not offer protection 
for the complex and 
dynamic local processes 
that conserve these 
resources over time 
May result in 
communities losing 
control of their resources 
Likely to result in 
conflicts between 
communities when 
decisions are made 
regarding commonly held 
resources. 
"Representative 
Organizations" do not 
truly represent 
indigenous communities 
and should not be 
responsible for granting 
prior informed consent 
It will be necessary to 
have external support 
to apply and enforce 
these mechanisms 
outside of the 
community 






Legal Experts and Policy Makers 
Why is the Law for 




The law has raised 




both inside and 
outside of the 
community. 
The law was 
designed to be as 
non-authoritarian as 
possible and to give 
as much decision 
making control as 
possible to 
indigenous peoples 





Requiring PIC gives 
communities the ability to 
make decisions based on 
their customs and norms 
Tools of Western law can 
correspond to the needs 
and priorities of 
communities, if The 
correct linkages are found 
How is this law likely 




The development of the 
law did not have a proper 
participatory 
methodology 
The law was designed 
under the assumption 
that the CBD captures 
national needs 
How can the 
compatibility of 
the two legal 
regimes be 
improved? 
The law is a work in 
progress that will 
need to be adapted 
as it is implemented 
Creative use of 
intellectual property 
tools to mend the gap 
between the legal 
systems 
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The general purpose 
of the law is to 
compensate 
indigenous peoples 
for the environmental 
services that they 
provide 
Intellectual Property 




The law may facilitate 




The law may create 
perverse incentives for 
communities to 
undermine their long 
term interests, for short 
term monetary benefits 
Representative 
organizations do not truly 
represent indigenous 
communities, and are not 
traditional decision-
making structures. 
No mechanism for 
resolving disputes that 
arise between 
communities. 
Need for educational 
efforts on the part of 




















Summary of Informant Group Perspectives 
ANDES NGO 
This set of interviews provided insight into the perspectives and opinions of two 
employees of ANDES NGO. Because employees demonstrated similar ideological 
positions, and there was a great deal of consistency in the opinions expressed in this set 
of interviews, they will be reported and analyzed as a group, rather than individually. 
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Why is customary governance important for the conservation of biodiversity and 
traditional knowledge? 
The shared perspective among ANDES NGO representatives is based on the 
general ideological position that all local conservation initiatives must begin with a deep 
respect and understanding of a community's vision of the world. Following this line of 
reasoning, it is thus considered highly important to respect and understand the traditional 
governance mechanisms of these communities in order to develop appropriate state 
conservation strategies. 
NGO staff explained that the major function of customary law is to conserve the 
complex political, economic, and ecological systems that exist at the local level. 
Customary law is dynamic, and is the means by which decisions are made to ensure that 
the complex local systems are maintained over time. One of the primary functions of 
local customary law is to maintain the overall diversity that local systems are based upon. 
Maintaining diversity within the community, including biological and intellectual 
diversity, is crucially important to ensure resilience and the long-term adaptability of the 
complex local systems. One NGO staff-member, explained that dynamic customary 
governance mechanisms of Andean communities could be credited with the very survival 
of these communities through historical processes of colonization, state intervention, and 
the forces of globalization. 
Community governance mechanisms play a particularly important role in steering 
and guiding community engagement with external actors, and institutions including 
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national laws. Traditional institutions have an important function, by providing an 
accepted means through which communities can make collective decisions regarding the 
community interpretation and community response to relevant laws. NGO staff 
explained that often if a national law presents opportunities to strengthen the complex 
system and diversity in the community, then the relevant authorities would decide to 
adopt the useful elements of this law. 
Alternatively, if a national law is determined to pose a threat to the local system, 
then the community governance mechanisms will reject those elements within the local 
laws. While in some cases, this process may create tensions between the two legal 
systems, it is necessary for communities to maintain strong local governance mechanisms 
in order to resist the negative elements of outside influences and benefit from the positive 
ones. 
Interviewees applied and explained this general ideological position in relation to 
the communities of the Potato Park. One interviewee cautioned against a false 
assumption that there is one "indigenous law" operating in the Andes. However, 
interviewees noted that there are many common principles, prevalent in the communities 
of the Potato Park, which are shared with many other communities in the region. 
Within the communities of the Potato Park, there are two distinct systems of local 
governance operating. On one hand, every year each community has its own authority 
that is elected to represent that community within national political processes. This 
system of local governance was imposed through a state mandated initiative in the 1960s. 
According to one ANDES interviewee, these community officials are mainly responsible 
for providing the link with national authorities and the state led "modernization" process. 
It was noted that individuals elected to this position, are not necessarily revered within 
their communities, but more out of a sense of obligation to appoint someone to the 
position, the selection is often one of convenience. 
According to interviewees, there is a parallel system of customary governance 
operating alongside this formal system in many Andean communities, and in all of the 
communities of the Potato Park. This is the traditional governance system. According to 
interviewees, these authorities continue to exert a great deal of influence in the 
communities of the Potato Park and in many Andean communities. Most of the 
structures and institutions that have existed in communities prior to the 1960's and the 
creation of the formal system, remain under the jurisdiction of the traditional authorities. 
For example the traditional assembly of the communities remains under the sanction of 
the traditional authorities and is responsible for decision-making regarding land 
distribution, water management, and resolution of conflict. 
A collaborative governance structure, linking the six communities of the Potato 
Park, constitutes a third type of governance structure operating in these communities. 
While the Potato Park governance system is recently created, it is derived from traditional 
governance principles and modes of operation, and is linked closely with the traditional 
governance mechanisms of each of the six communities. The Potato Park governance 
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system was created out of discussions that began in 2000 with elders and traditional 
institutions from the six communities as well as representatives of ANDES. At this time, 
there were many conflicts taking place between the communities of the potato park, and 
one of the major incentives was to develop a collaborative system to ameliorate these. 
Through a co-evolutionary exchange of ideas, and a common belief in the need 
for a collective approach to conserving the entire landscape of the region, the Potato 
Park's governance strategy was developed. Each community now has an additional 
elected official known as a "barefoot technician" that is responsible for coordinating and 
representing their community in the Potato Park decision making, and collaboration with 
ANDES on Potato Park related activities. An intercommunity agreement is in the process 
of being negotiated, which will provide a common strategy for landscape conservation 
and identify common principles related to access and benefit sharing. Because both the 
governance mechanisms of the Potato Park and the Inter-community agreement are based 
on customary principles common to the six communities, they are considered by NGO 
staff to be derivative of customary law. 
NGO representatives also provided useful information about the efforts of the 
Potato Park communities to conserve and maintain their genetic resources and associated 
traditional knowledge. All community efforts, it was explained, originate from the 
ideological position that traditional knowledge and genetic resources cannot be separated 
from the landscape and cosmo-vision within which they were developed and are being 
conserved. Accordingly, NGO staff explained that all community efforts to conserve 
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genetic resources and traditional knowledge are just part of a larger collective effort to 
conserve the landscape, and the complex systems in which these resources are situated. 
How will the Law for the Protection of Traditional Knowledge strengthen 
Traditional Governance mechanisms of the ANDES Potato Park? 
NGO staff took the common position that it is not likely that the Law for the 
Protection of Traditional Knowledge will offer any significant benefits for indigenous 
communities in Peru. One interviewee proposed that should the Law contain elements 
that indigenous communities deem to be useful then these aspects would be readily 
introduced and integrated into community customary governance mechanisms. However, 
in the case of the Law for the Protection of traditional knowledge, NGO staff did not see 
much potential for this law to strengthen or protect the community system. 
How does the Law for the Protection of Traditional Knowledge threaten the 
Traditional governance mechanisms of the ANDES Potato Park? 
Interviewees expressed a number of particular concerns, in addition to general 
skepticism, regarding the impact of the law on community governance of these resources. 
According to one interviewee, the first level of conflict can be seen in the way that the 
national and local levels of governance define "protection". According to one informant 
discussing the community perspective, "protection" of genetic resources and traditional 
knowledge is just part of a large effort to conserve the overall wellbeing of the way of 
life. In other words, it is just one aspect of the larger effort to protect and manage the 
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complex system that provides a collective sense of well-being. From a community point 
of view this means such things as the protection of the free flow of genetic resources and 
knowledge, the protection of traditional governance, and the ability to make collective 
decisions regarding these resources. 
In contrast, interviewees expressed that the Law for the protection of Traditional 
Knowledge is overly focused on protecting genetic resources and traditional knowledge 
solely as potential commercial products. Ironically, this form of protection undermines 
traditional uses and practices, over-emphasizes the benefits associated with the 
commercialization and privatization of these resources. The implementation of this law, 
threatens to interrupt traditional flows and practices that are central to the wellbeing of 
communities. In the words of one informant "a seed is not just a seed, but also a culture. 
It cannot be separated from the entire landscape". Instead, the communities of the Potato 
Park use the concept of the Bio-Cultural Heritage as the concept at the centre of a much 
more holistic conservation project. Any paradigm for local conservation, it follows, has 
to start with a community vision of life. 
NGO representatives expressed a common view that external conservation models 
including the Law for the Protection of Traditional Knowledge, are often much too 
narrow and based on an outsider's vision of the world. Following this logic, it is not only 
the law for the Protection of Traditional Knowledge that is considered misguided, but one 
of the interviewees expressed the opinion that problem begins at the International level, 
specifically with the Convention on Biological Diversity as well as the Free Trade 
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Agreements with the United States. According to one ANDES employee, the objectives 
of the Convention, and specifically its focus on commercialization and commodification 
is at the root of the problem, as the entire approach has been a top down process 
beginning at the International level. 
How could the compatibility of the Law for the Protection of Traditional Knowledge 
and the traditional governance mechanisms of the ANDES Potato Park be 
improved? 
According to interviewees, collaboration could be improved if the top down 
nature of policy making is reversed, and begins instead with respect for local visions of 
the world. This is founded on the assumption that the communities of the Potato Park are 
rich in their own capacities to govern genetic resources and traditional knowledge. For 
this reason, ANDES supports the communities' efforts to develop a sui generis ABS 
system. However, at the same time, it was noted that it is very important to build bridges 
between various political and economic systems, in order to eliminate a potential source 
of conflict. It was noted that if communities don't integrate to some extent, they are 
likely to be dominated. 
Two possibilities for bridging this gap were suggested. Both suggestions can be 
categorized as bottom up approaches to integrating state and local governance 
mechanisms. The first suggestion was that communities should seek international 
protection of their sui generis systems in order to gain state support. The interviewee, 
who suggested this approach, was quite skeptical about the motivation and the intention 
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of the Peruvian government with respect to indigenous communities in Peru. Describing 
the political system as being deeply corrupt and institutionally racist, this approach was 
seen as a way to gain external support, by first looking to the international community. 
The logic behind this approach was that if an international institution such as WIPO or 
IUCN offered recognition and protection of an international sui generis system based on 
the model of the Potato Park, then the Peruvian state would likely be required to come on 
board providing the external support necessary. 
Secondly, it was suggested that there might be some emerging potential for 
communities to work more closely with the decentralized regional government. 
However in doing so, it was recommended that all decision-making regarding community 
resources must remain in the hands of the communities. However, optimism was 
expressed regarding the potential role that the regional government could play in terms of 
implementing and enforcing the Park's sui generis system outside of the community, and 
mediating potential conflicts between communities. 
Finally, ANDES representatives recognized that while the threat of biopiracy is 
often over-stated as the primary threat to conservation of genetic resources and traditional 
knowledge, it is still a threat, and the state will have to be involved in its prevention. It 
was believed that the regional government is more likely to be more in touch with - and 
responsive to- the issues at the level of the community, and that there is a greater level of 
respect and trust for regional authorities. While the regional government is often quite 
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limited in terms of its authority, staff expressed optimism in the ability to work with the 
regional government who could then negotiate on their behalf for greater state support. 
Community Members 
While many experts caution against the assumption that community members 
speak with one voice, in the case of my work with the community members of the potato 
park, it was the choice of the elected Potato Park authorities (barefoot technicians) that all 
interviews be held in a group setting including potato park community traditional and 
formal authorities, a women's medicinal plants collective, and the representatives of the 
community to the potato park. Within these settings it was quite apparent that 
participants were expressing a commonly held perspective and all responses were given 
as a unified perspective. For this reason the perspectives of participants in both the focus 
group with the "barefoot technicians" and the community assembly workshop will be 
reviewed and analyzed as one. 
What is the importance and function of community governance mechanisms? 
Community members explained that traditional governance mechanisms are of 
central importance to the preservation of their way of life. These are the mechanisms by 
which the conservation model functions, and therefore when thinking about issues related 
to the protection of genetic resources and traditional knowledge, it is necessary to protect 
and conserve not only the resources but the entire conservation model, social 
arrangements and mechanisms for decision making. Traditional governance mechanisms 
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are the means by which communities strive toward the principle goal and conserve the 
ultimate benefit of these resources. The ultimate goal is to maintain complete control of 
these resources within the community, whereas the ultimate benefit is the daily use of 
these resources within the community. 
According to one community member, protection of genetic resources and 
traditional knowledge, means having governance mechanisms in place that ensure that 
these resources are conserved for future generations. Traditional knowledge and genetic 
resources are not just resources, but they are connected to the entire way of life of the 
communities of the Potato Park. 
Beyond explaining the importance of the traditional governance mechanisms of 
the Potato Park communities, community members explained how these mechanisms 
function and make decisions regarding traditional knowledge, and genetic resources. The 
basic premise governing exchange and sharing of these resources is the Andean principle 
of reciprocity or (anyi in Quechua), which community members explained is one of the 
guiding principles of all areas of their lives. As one community member put it, this 
means, "Good intentions are met with good intentions". When making decisions 
regarding the exchange of these resources, decision makers will take into account why 
the outsider wants access to these resources and how external agents are likely to use 
these resources in the future. One community member explained that communities are 
quite content to share knowledge when an outsider expresses a justifiable need, however 
there are some types of knowledge that require complete secrecy. 
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Community members then described the traditional process for making such a 
decision. Communities generally require that an external agent desiring access to 
community knowledge and /or resources must present their intentions to the traditional 
community assembly, and clearly explain how each party will benefit from the exchange. 
The assembly, consisting of traditional authorities will then make a private decision 
based on both the intentions of the outsider, and the potential benefits for the community. 
There is no general rule of thumb for making such decisions instead each decision will be 
made on a case by case basis considering each situation independently. Community 
members expressed the importance of community governance mechanisms in this regard 
to ensure that knowledge in resources are shared in a way that benefits, rather than 
destroys or undermines the community way of life. While community members 
acknowledge that on various occasions they will turn to external organization such as 
ANDES to ask for guidance or training, in the end all decisions are made through internal 
institutions and decision making structures and communities remain in full control of 
their own decisions. 
In what ways does the law for the Protection of Traditional Knowledge strengthen 
traditional governance mechanisms of the ANDES Potato Park? 
Community members were not very optimistic about the opportunities for the 
Law for the Protection of Traditional Knowledge to strengthen internal governance 
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mechanisms. However, it was noted that the communities have already begun the process 
of developing local registries for the protection of traditional medicinal knowledge, so 
there is some synergy on that approach. 
In what ways does the law for the Protection of Traditional Knowledge pose threats 
to traditional governance mechanisms of the ANDES Potato Park? 
Discussion of the potential threats took up the majority of each of the meetings 
with the community. Most of the discussion was underpinned by a deep general 
suspicion of working with the state and state led conservation initiatives. Criticisms of 
the law focused around three major themes. The first criticism was that the scope of the 
law is far too narrow; secondly criticisms displayed deep suspicions of outsiders" 
intentions, and finally a fear of losing control of their resources. Community members 
shared a general feeling that the Law for the Protection of Traditional Knowledge fails to 
address many of the key issues regarding community members' perceptions of what it 
means to protect traditional knowledge. From this perspective protection encompasses 
not only protection of the resources, but also the protection of the landscape in which 
these resources are situated, the right to land, as well as protection of the governance 
mechanisms that conserve these resources. 
Several community members felt that the definition of indigenous peoples offered 
in the law was too narrow, and noted that this term carries a lot of historical baggage. 
Secondly, a number of individuals suggested that the scope of the law falls short of 
offering full protection of community traditional knowledge, in that it only protects that 
knowledge specifically related to genetic resources. It was emphasized that any effort to 
conserve traditional knowledge must begin with a broader vision, recognizing the 
interconnection of traditional knowledge with culture, language and local agricultural 
systems. 
Also in order to protect traditional knowledge and genetic resources, community 
members explained that it is not appropriate to focus on conserving these resources as if 
they are in a museum, but also efforts must be taken to conserve the complex and 
dynamic processes which conserve and continue to develop and improve these resources. 
To protect traditional knowledge and genetic resources means also to continue to seek 
diversification at the community level. These complex and dynamic governance 
processes are also necessary to ensure that knowledge is respected and passed down to 
the next generations. 
Finally community members stressed that the threat of biopiracy is not the only 
threat to the conservation of traditional knowledge and genetic resources. These 
resources are also being undermined by other external factors such as the church, the 
introduction of modern technologies, the influence of encroaching urban centers and the 
formal education system. Community members also addressed a number of fears 
regarding outsider's intentions, and the effect that this law is likely to have on the ability 
of communities to retain decision-making control over their resources. Deep suspicion of 
government intentions was expressed throughout both meetings. In trying to understand 
92 
the purpose of this study, one community member pointedly asked, "and you think that 
they would listen to us if we wanted to change the law?" Community members also 
expressed deep fears about the patent system and outsiders' intentions to misappropriate 
and commercialize their knowledge and resources. In almost every discussion regarding 
outsiders' use of community knowledge and resources, focused on the case of an outsider 
wishing to patent the resource for commercial purposes. Community members were very 
skeptical of the patent system, as they felt that it was designed for individually held rights 
to knowledge, and in a worse case situation may undermine the community's ability to 
continue to use and govern and exchange their resources. 
Community members addressed a number of concerns, related to the effects that 
this law will have on their ability to maintain decision-making control within the 
community. Of primary concern was the significance given to "representative 
organizations" in the Law for the Protection of Traditional Knowledge. It was noted that 
the communities of the Potato Park are not formally affiliated with any "representative 
organization". Additionally, the communities generally felt uneasy and expressed 
opposition to the idea of being represented and giving formal decision-making control to 
an external institution. Community members were very clear that they intend to represent 
themselves as the Potato Park, and all decision making regarding their resources should 
be made by traditional authorities within each community. 
While there was no question about where decision making authority should 
remain, community members expressed concern that the system set out in the law is 
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likely to create conflicts between and among communities who have different views 
about how to manage commonly held knowledge and resources. The general sentiment 
was that no one community should receive benefits for knowledge and resources that are 
shared commonly amongst communities. Community members discussed possible 
solutions to this problem and concluded that they are not in the position to suggest a 
solution for a problem that is foreign to them. 
In what ways could the compatibility of the Law for the Protection of Traditional 
Knowledge and Customary Governance Mechanisms of the ANDES Potato Park be 
improved? 
A number of recommendations were made in terms of how the communities of 
the Potato Park could work with the state in the effort to preserve traditional knowledge 
and genetic resources. First, community members acknowledged that much of the 
responsibility for the conservation of traditional knowledge and genetic resources falls 
within the jurisdiction of the community itself. In some cases the protection of traditional 
knowledge and genetic resources can be done by strengthening internal systems, which is 
exactly what has been done in the case of the communities of the Potato Park. One 
individual noted that the strengthening of community governance mechanisms has not 
only provided greater for protection for existing resources but has also succeeded in 
bringing back traditional resources that had been lost to the communities through the 
repatriation agreement with the International Potato Centre. Community members 
stressed that this type of initiative does not require state intervention and provides an 
effective means of preserving this knowledge for future use within the community. 
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While recognizing that the community itself has a strong role to play, community 
members were also cognizant of the fact that this effort will also require some external 
support. For example, community members recognized that traditional governance 
mechanisms are not effective mechanisms for protecting against the threat against 
biopiracy. While biopiracy is only one of a wide range of threats, it was suggested that 
communities require state support to develop a system to protect against outside 
appropriation of their resources. 
In order to do this community members stated that ideally the state would 
recognize and enforce community governance mechanisms. While community members 
expressed hesitation regarding the codification of their laws, it was proposed that the state 
could play an important role in helping communities to enforce their laws outside of the 
community. There was a general sentiment that all national laws should recognize and 
legitimize local laws. While community members expressed optimism about working 
with external institutions in this process, they remained adamant that decision making 
authority must remain at the level of the community. 
At the same time, community members addressed the fact that community laws, 
and governance mechanisms are not consistent across all indigenous communities in 
Peru. In order to remedy potential conflicts it would be necessary to create effective 
institutions for decision-making and conflict resolution across indigenous communities 
sharing common resources and knowledge. One community member suggested that the 
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development of an indigenous congress might be useful to address this 
institutional/organizational gap. Another community member suggested that it would be 
better for communities to organize within each district, working up toward the district, 
provincial, regional and national recognition of customary governance mechanisms. 
Community members felt that a bottom up approach to governance would allow 
for a broader approach based on community needs and would ensure that national 
conservation efforts would not undermine the culture and traditions that exist at the local 
level. Any effort to conserve community resources must strengthen rather than 
undermine local systems and should be consistent with community values, for example 
the guiding principle of reciprocity. The national access and benefit sharing system must 
reflect the fact that the ultimate goal of community conservation is continued day-to-day 
use of their resources, and the ultimate goal is to maintain internal control of these 
resources through their customary governance mechanisms. 
Legal Experts and Policy Makers 
Background Information on the Development and Implementation of the Law for 
the Protection of Traditional Knowledge 
Interviewees were very consistent in the view that there is a big gap between what 
the Law for the Protection of Traditional Knowledge says and how it is being 
implemented. A number of interviewees were candid about the fact that at the time of the 
interviews very few benefits have been accrued to indigenous communities as a result of 
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this law. Many interviewees expressed the view that the law is a work in progress, and 
that as it moves into the implementation phase it will need to be simplified, and adapted 
to respond to challenges and gaps. In the words of one interviewee, what exists now "is 
more political than it is practical. Basically there have not been a lot of benefits accrued, 
this is just a draft". 
A number of interviewees noted that the process of the development of the law 
did not have a proper participatory methodology. More specifically, there was a common 
perspective that indigenous communities were not adequately represented in the design of 
the law. During the development of the law, policy makers were working under tight 
financial and time constraints, and at there was a lot of pressure coming from 
international bodies, as well as from different domestic interest groups. A number of 
interviewees explained that the law was designed to fulfill Peru's obligations to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity under the assumption that the CBD captures national 
needs. Also, explained one interviewee, the Peruvian government is strongly committed 
to a number of bilateral trade agreements (Singapore, U.S., Canada and China) which 
take precedence over international and national laws and will undoubtedly have influence 
over the implementation of this law. A number of interviewees expressed concern about 
the fact that there is no coherent national mechanism for decision making related to ABS, 
and that government ministries are fragmented and disorganized when it comes to this 
issue. Some ministries are more interested than others in pushing biotrade, and further 
confusion comes from the fact that jurisdiction over biodiversity and traditional 
knowledge is shared by two different government ministries (INIA and IRENA). 
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While a number of interviewees expressed concern about the process and the 
content of the law, many interviewees shared the view that the law is not yet in its final 
state, and that the intention of policy makers involved in its development were good. The 
ultimate goal was to design a national system for the protection of traditional knowledge 
that would contribute to improving the livelihoods of indigenous people. One interviewee 
explained that while the process was not sufficiently participatory, those who did 
participate in the development of this law (mainly intellectual property lawyers) designed 
the law to be as non-authoritarian as possible. In the design of the law, policy makers 
took account of the fact that the state has not always been seen as a good representative 
of indigenous peoples. 
How will this law strengthen customary governance mechanisms? 
While for the most part there was agreement regarding intentions and the process 
of developing the law, when it came to assessing its potential impacts on customary 
governance mechanisms perspectives became much more varied. 
Of the eight individuals interviewed, only one felt that the law for the Protection 
of Traditional Knowledge could potentially strengthen customary governance. Two other 
interviewees felt that the law may benefit communities, which would have indirect 
positive impacts on the customary governance mechanisms. 
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The individual taking the former perspective noted that the law requires that 
communities provide prior informed consent before outsiders are able to use their 
traditional knowledge. This provision, thus, provides a window of opportunity to make 
decisions based on their particular customs and norms within the community. At the 
same time this individual argued that it is quite possible for western law and customary 
law to be compatible. This interviewee argued that while the interests in community may 
be different than those outside the community, it is usually quite possible to find a 
western legal tool to correspond to community interests and needs. For example in 
communities there is often a sense of collectiveness and an aversion to the institution of 
private property, but at the same time there is a strong sense of what belongs to the 
community and what does not. This individual proposed that the tools of western law, 
can correspond to these needs and priorities, and can be used to protect the collective 
property of communities. The purpose of this law, according to this interviewee, should 
be to find the correct linkages between the two systems of law. While rejecting the 
proposition that there is an inherent and radical divide between the two systems, this 
interviewee instead argues that Western law has to be used and applied creatively in a 
complementary fashion. 
Others argued that the law for the Protection of Traditional Knowledge might 
indirectly strengthen customary governance mechanisms. One of the indirect benefits has 
been a general awareness rising of the importance of indigenous knowledge and 
customary practices, both inside and outside of the communities. One interviewee argued 
that this Law is creating conscious development within the communities. Using the 
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Potato Park as an example, it was argued that many communities are likely to organize 
and respond to the issues raised in the law, reinvigorating and adapting traditional 
decision making processes. Another interviewee proposed that this law might indirectly 
strengthen community systems, by providing positive economic incentives for people to 
stay in the community, addressing the threat of migration to customary practices. In the 
words of this individual, "In order to have vibrant communities, we need to provide some 
incentives for people to stay. The Law is intended to compensate indigenous communities 
for the services they are providing". 
How is this law likely to threaten customary governance mechanisms? 
All policy makers interviewed felt that there was at least some degree of risk that 
the implementation of the current law may undermine or pose challenges to customary 
governance mechanisms. While the degree of risk expected varied from interviewee to 
interviewee some common themes emerged. These concerns included the fear that 
biopiracy may in fact be stimulated, and that intellectual property rights are inherently 
inconsistent with traditional governance mechanisms, that the incentive structure 
resulting is inappropriate, and finally that conflict may result as an effect of under-
representation of indigenous communities. 
A few of the policy makers held the view that the Law for the Protection of 
Traditional Knowledge may actually facilitate rather than prevent biopiracy. A major 
problem from this point of view is that the law is overly focused on facilitating the 
commercialization of traditional knowledge. According to one interviewee, this is 
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basically a result of a lack of vision stemming from the Convention on Biological 
Diversity. 
Another participant felt that while, facilitating biopiracy is certainly not an 
intended outcome of the law, there is a risk that its complexity may force outsiders to 
work outside of the law, or to go to another country to acquire the same resource. Along 
the same lines, one interviewee also argued that the law was negligent in preventing 
biopiracy, by exempting all traditional knowledge that has been in the public domain for 
more than 20 years, from its regulations. Another interviewee was more concerned 
about the misappropriation of genetic resources and traditional knowledge at the hands of 
the government stating that, "this government is very paternalistic. I'm sure the money 
will stay in Lima ". 
A second inconsistency highlighted by interviewees was the perceived conflict 
between Western intellectual property rights and community governance mechanisms. In 
contrast to the position reviewed in the previous section, a number of interviewees felt 
that intellectual property tools are entirely inappropriate and undermine communities" 
ability to manage their resources according to their own mechanisms. One interviewee 
explained that intellectual property tools are effective tools for protecting and enforcing 
individual ownership, however in the case of collective ownership these principles are 
entirely wrong. The reliance of the Law on existing intellectual property tools will 
inherently undermine traditional governance mechanisms and force communities to adapt 
the management of their resources to correspond with western conceptions of ownership. 
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A few interviewees worried about the impacts of outsider patents on plants traditionally 
grown and used in communities. The major concern here was that farmers' ability to 
commercialize and export their crops might be undermined. 
Another level of conflict discussed mainly by two interviewees, was the nature of 
incentives offered by the law. One point of view was that the design of this law might 
unintentionally provide perverse incentives (mainly commercial) putting pressure on 
communities to make decisions that may or may not be in their long-term interest. It was 
argued that while the law relies too heavily on short-term commercial incentives, it failed 
to recognize other priorities in communities such as health, food security, and education. 
At the same time the working group that created the law failed to recognize that 
community cultural pride is a major motivating factor in community conservation efforts. 
Rather than nurturing this pride, the law may actually undermine traditional incentive 
structures. One interviewee explained the lack of indigenous participation in the 
development of the law, as an indicator of community priorities. "Communities did not 
come to our meetings, even when they were invited, because they simply have different 
priorities". 
The majority of interviewees expressed concern that the decision-making 
processes promoted in the Law may actually undermine traditional governance 
mechanisms. A major concern was the Law's reliance on "representative organizations" 
to make decisions and provide consent on behalf of communities. One interviewee 
opposed this function, because representative organizations are not traditional decision-
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making structures. Another interviewee criticized the undemocratic nature of 
representative organizations stating that they are an ad hoc system, mostly funded by 
international donors, and tend to only represent a small group of communities and again 
only a small fraction of those within each community. 
Criticism was also levied at the law's approach to resolving conflicts between 
communities. While the law proposes that when making decisions, communities should 
try to the greatest extent possible to inform other communities about the decision, one 
interviewee felt that this is not enough, and that by failing to resolve discrepancies at the 
community level may actually lead to conflicts between communities. 
Another concern is that the law does not respect the different priorities and 
interests of various communities. According to one interviewee, "I think that all 
communities have traditional governance mechanisms to govern their traditional 
knowledge and genetic resources; however there is not one traditional governance 
system, but a series. For example for some communities the concept of private property 
is quite foreign, but others are much more commercially oriented. This may create 
problems at the local level". There was also concern that the major differences between 
the Andean - and Amazonian cosmologies were not accounted for. 
Legal Experts and Policy Makers: How could the compatibility of the two legal 
regimes be improved? 
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Policy makers and legal experts presented a range of suggestions about how the 
gap between the traditional governance mechanisms and the Law for the Protection of 
Traditional Knowledge could be mended. While only one or two interviewees 
championed some suggestions, it is notable that a few of these suggestions were 
advocated strongly across the interviewees. 
One interviewee advocated for the creative use of intellectual property tools as a 
practical and effective way to protect traditional governance mechanisms. This 
individual confessed that the law would need to adjust its current usage of intellectual 
property laws, to correspond with traditional governance mechanisms; however the 
essential similarities between the two systems of law should correspond with existing 
tools. S/he reasoned that there is a need to move beyond thinking of intellectual property 
tools simply in terms of patents, and to recognize that there are other effective tools out 
there including trademarks, appellations of origin, breeders' rights, copyrights, as well as 
a number of external instruments that can be used to strengthen local systems. The same 
interviewee further acknowledged that a challenge to this approach would be overcoming 
the great degree of suspicion and misunderstanding of intellectual property tools within 
communities. 
While this first interviewee felt that the law simply requires some minor tinkering 
to become more compatible with customary governance mechanisms, at the other 
extreme was an individual who felt that the entire approach of the law is overly focused 
on the prevention of biopiracy, and advocated for a much more holistic approach for the 
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protection of traditional knowledge and biodiversity. This interviewee proposed that the 
entire scope of the legislation should be reworked to address other more challenges in the 
areas of health care, education, agricultural extension, and organized religion to name a 
few. 
A couple of individuals took the position that the problem of compatibility is 
rooted in government priorities, and therefore the solution will require political 
willingness of those in decision making roles. Accepting that the current government 
simply has other priorities, this individual felt that the solution would depend largely 
upon the priorities of the incoming government. 
While suggestions for increasing compatibility were quite diverse, there was a 
great degree of consistency with regard to two issues. These are the need for new 
institutions to truly represent indigenous communities in Peru, and secondly the need for 
increased efforts in cross cultural education. 
Most interviewees agreed that the representative organizations that exist now are 
not appropriate to play the important function that they are given in the law. While 
interviewees did not criticize the efforts of these organizations, they were seen as 
inappropriate for a number of reasons including the fact that they are not traditional 
structures or derived from traditional structures, they do not represent all communities in 
Peru, and they are prone to conflict with each other. At the same time, it was widely 
proposed that indigenous communities need institutions through which they can organize 
105 
effectively to make collective decisions, thereby minimizing conflict among and between 
communities. A variety of solutions were proposed about how this could be done, and 
what these institutional structures might look like. 
One interviewee suggested that an appropriate institutional response would be for 
communities to join together to develop collective protocols outlining their approach to 
protecting and regulating their traditional knowledge. This interviewee suggested that it 
would be logical for communities to organize by ethnic group and possibly even across 
borders in the Andes region for these protocols to be truly representative. Yet another 
interviewee cautioned that there is a need for very fresh thinking about how this type of 
organizational structure would be set up. In the past there have been state efforts to set 
up "representative bodies" and from the perspective of this individual these efforts have 
been a "disaster", but felt that there may be some useful and interesting opportunities for 
a new approach working with the regional and local authorities. 
This interviewee was not alone in this perspective. A number of interviewees felt 
very positive about the new possibilities opening up as a result of the ongoing 
decentralization process in Peru. It was suggested that indigenous communities would 
likely be more successful in having their interests reflected in legislation and regulations 
at the level of the local government. One interviewee felt hopeful about the prospect of 
having the national law translated into local regulations, which would be more suitable 
for each particular locality. 
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At the same time it was cautioned, that while conceptually the prospect of 
communities working more closely with the regional and local governments is a 
possibility, this is something that will take time as these governments are still in the 
process of evolving and adapting to their new roles. Another limitation is the 
geographical distribution of these governments. In order for the local government to 
represent local communities effectively it will be necessary to redistribute local 
government boundaries to reflect the current situation. From this perspective it is still 
too early to predict the outcome of the decentralization process, but it may present an 
important and meaningful opportunity to build capacity and relationships at the regional 
level. 
By far the greatest degree of agreement among the legal experts and policy 
makers was around the need for intercultural exchange through education to soften the 
divide between state and local governance mechanisms. It was proposed that increased 
awareness and education are needed at both the level of the community as well as 
amongst policy makers in order to mend the ideological gap. 
One expert pointed out that most policy makers are not familiar with what is 
happening inside communities. One rather obvious way of increasing this understanding 
is to encourage greater participation of indigenous communities in the law making 
process. It was proposed that the national education system in Peru could facilitate 
needed intercultural exchange by designing curriculum that celebrates indigenous 
cultures and ethno-diversity. 
107 
Policy makers also called for education and awareness-raising efforts at the local-
level. Specifically, it was proposed that community members must be educated about the 
law and the legal principles that it entails in order for them to respond in an informed 
manner. Specifically, one interviewee stressed that community members must be made 
aware of the fact that this law is being developed to benefit indigenous communities. 
Another interviewee followed this logic, stressing that it is important that community 
members have a realistic impression of the type and quantity of benefits that are likely to 
arise. 
Also, in order to counter-act the perceived suspicion amongst community 
members it was suggested that community members need a better understanding of both 
the intent of the law, as well as the tools that are being used. For example, one 
interviewee explained, that there is still a great degree of misunderstanding of intellectual 
property tools at the community level. For example the risks of outsider patents have 
been greatly inflated, and are not likely to interfere with the communities' ability to 
engage in traditional practices. 
Finally, there was agreement that if community members are to be responsible for 
making decisions such as granting prior informed consent, it is imperative that they are 
aware of and understand their rights with respect to this law. 
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Chapter 6- Analysis of Findings 
Abstract: This chapter will draw upon the Findings presented in the previous chapter to 
answer the major research questions set out in this research project. In this chapter the 
perspectives of each of the major informant groups will be analyzed together to 
synthesize answers to the following questions: "In what ways does the Law for the 
Protection of Traditional Knowledge create opportunities to strengthen customary 
governance of traditional knowledge and genetic resources in the ANDES Potato 
Park? "; "In what ways does the Law for the Protection of Traditional Knowledge 
threaten customary governance of traditional knowledge and genetic resources in the 
ANDES Potato Park? "; and finally, "How could the compatibility of the Law for the 
Protection of Traditional Knowledge and the customary governance mechanisms of the 
ANDES Potato Park be improved? To conclude this section the findings of this section 
will be analyzed in relation to the theory of community based co-management introduced 
in the first section of the literature review. 
Research Question 1: In what ways does the Law for the Protection of Traditional 
Knowledge create opportunities to strengthen customary governance of traditional 
knowledge and associated biodiversity in the ANDES Potato Park? 
• Necessity for Co-management 
Interviewees from both major stakeholder groups recognized that biopiracy is a 
significant threat that cannot be prevented by traditional governance mechanisms alone. 
While traditional governance mechanisms are the primary means of making decisions 
within communities and sometimes even between communities, it is very difficult for 
communities to enforce these mechanisms on outsiders and to prevent the 
misappropriation of their resources. Thus it is certain that in order to address these issues 
communities will need the support of external institutions in order to protect themselves 
against external threats. 
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At the same time, traditional governance mechanisms are integrally important to 
the maintenance and conservation of traditional knowledge and genetic resources within 
communities. Any state-led effort to conserve and protect these resources must 
strengthen rather than undermine the systems in which these resources are embedded and 
conserved including the traditional governance mechanisms. So while traditional 
governance mechanisms are not capable of being entirely effective on their own, they can 
and must play an important part in the state institutional structure for the protection of 
these resources. This creates a real possibility for meaningful state-community co-
management. 
• Both regimes are flexible, dynamic, and capable of Adapting to New Realities 
While these two governance regimes are not yet entirely compatible, it is 
significant that both regimes are not static or inflexible. The law for the Protection of 
Traditional Knowledge is a work in progress and policy makers recognize that it will 
need to be modified in a process of trial and error as it is being implemented. It is also 
widely recognized by policy makers that the level of indigenous involvement in its 
development was minimal and thus what is on paper now may be nothing more than a 
starting point to jump off from. On the other hand, the very nature of customary law is a 
system of governance that is dynamic and changes over time to adapt to new realities 
internal and external to the community. The communities of the Potato Park recognize 
that it is possible to benefit from outside opportunities and that it is not in their benefit to 
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remain in isolation. The flexibility of the two regimes creates the possibility for increased 
compatibility in the future. 
• Mutual Recognition of the Importance of Local Control 
Policy makers explained that the Law for the Protection of Traditional Knowledge 
was designed to be as non-authoritarian as possible, and to give as much decision making 
control as possible to indigenous peoples through the enforcement of prior informed 
consent. While it was the "representative organizations" rather than the communities 
themselves that were granted the authority to provide prior informed consent, the law 
does demonstrate a willingness of the state to decentralize decision-making with regard to 
traditional knowledge. However, there are still important questions to be answered about 
the ability of these organizations to truly represent community interests, and the 
importance of community decision-making. 
• Western Law and Community Governance Mechanisms are not Inherently in Conflict 
While it was evident that there was a degree of suspicion of Western legal 
institutions (especially externally held patents) within the community, it was also 
apparent that the communities were starting to use some intellectual property tools to 
their own advantage such as local registries within the community. If communities are 
educated and accepting of Western tools, they can be used creatively to bridge the gap 
between the two systems of governance. 
Research Question 2: In what ways does the Law for the Protection of Traditional 
Knowledge threaten customary governance of traditional knowledge and associated 
biodiversity in the ANDES Potato Park? 
• Undermines Community Cosmo-Vision 
The law for the Protection of Traditional Knowledge and the Convention on 
Biological Diversity originates from a Western view of the world. Customary 
Governance mechanisms on the other hand originate from entirely different cosmologies. 
Thus it is not only the principles of the particular legal regimes that will need to be 
bridged, but also their fundamental moral and ethical underpinnings. 
• Conservation Approach too Narrow 
There is a general sentiment amongst community members and even some policy 
makers that the law for the Protection of Traditional Knowledge is too narrow, and 
particularly overly focused on the commercialization and commodification of these 
resources. The law over-emphasizes biopiracy or outside misappropriation of these 
resources as the principle threat to the conservation of traditional knowledge and genetic 
resources and at the same time ignores other more pressing concerns such as the loss of 
language, outward migration, western education, and encroaching urban centres. 
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• Divergent Ideas about "Protection " 
It is evident that a wide range of opinions exist as to what it means to truly 
"protect" traditional knowledge. On one hand within the circles of policy makers and 
legal experts "protection" is commonly thought of in terms of protecting against 
biopiracy and protecting indigenous communities' rights to commercialize and receive 
monetary benefits from outsiders' use of their resources. 
An alternative vision of protection promoted by community members as well as a 
number of other interviewees is much more holistic. This vision recognizes the 
embeddedness of these resources within complex local systems and the importance of 
maintaining decision-making control within the community. This vision of protection is 
foremost concerned with the protection of the day-to-day uses of these resources within 
the community. It also encompasses the right to land, the protection of the free flow of 
seeds, as well as maintaining control of these resources so that they can be passed on to 
future generations. In addition to the threat of biopiracy, other threats were identified 
such as Western education, agricultural extension and the introduction of modern 
technologies, encroaching urban centres, outward migration, and the loss of culture and 
language within the communities. 
• Assumes common interests across Indigenous Communities 
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By granting decision making control to "representative organizations" this legal 
regime assumes that these organizations are capable of representing the "indigenous 
perspective". This does not account for the fact that there is not one "indigenous law", 
but a diverse and sometimes competing series of "customary laws" across indigenous 
communities. It is necessary for the law to recognize this variance, and to develop an 
acceptable mechanism for solving disputes amongst communities. 
• Institutional Structure for Representation and Decision Making is Inappropriate 
Evidence from this research project demonstrates that the current "representative 
organizations" in Peru are not appropriate institutions to grant prior informed consent and 
to make decisions on behalf of communities. The communities of the Potato Park 
contested this system, stating that these organizations do not represent them, and that they 
do not feel comfortable with external organizations making decisions about their 
resources on their behalf. This current system is likely to create conflicts between 
communities, with only a limited number of communities feeling "represented" by this ad 
hoc system of institutions. "Representative organizations" are not elected by indigenous 
communities, but are rather an ad hoc system of organizations, which largely receive 
their funding and legitimacy from external international donor organizations. 
• Deep Suspicion of Western Law and Outsider Intentions 
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Any attempt at co-management will require a softening of community suspicion 
and resentment towards the Western legal system and the state. It was evident that the 
communities of the Potato Park have a deep-rooted concern and suspicion of Western 
tools, especially patents, as well as the intentions of policy makers to hear their voices, 
and represent their interests and concerns. 
Research Question 3: How could the compatibility of the Law for the Protection of 
Traditional Knowledge and Customary Governance Mechanisms of the ANDES Potato 
Park be improved? 
• Greater Participation 
It is essential to the legitimacy and effectiveness of this Law that indigenous 
peoples meaningfully participate in the adaptation and implementation of this Law. It 
was evident in the background research and interviews with policy makers and legal 
experts that opportunities for participation have been extremely limited, and that despite 
positive intentions the design has largely been a top-down process beginning with the 
negotiations at the Convention of Biological Diversity. In order for this law to respect 
and correspond with customary governance mechanisms it is imperative that the 
pressures stemming from International agreements are balanced with the needs, interests 
and conservation methods of indigenous peoples of Peru. There will be a need to re-open 
this discussion with communities across Peru, even if this means significantly adapting 
the current legal framework. 
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• Education and Inter-cultural Exchange 
There is a need for education and intercultural exchange between those 
individuals creating policy and those who will be most affected by its impacts. On one 
hand, it is evident that policy makers would be more effective in their roles, if they had a 
more vivid and nuanced understanding of what is actually happening inside of 
communities and what these communities have been doing for millennia to govern and 
manage their resources. A second benefit of establishing participatory processes would 
be the education of policy makers through discussions and negotiations with policy 
makers. In particular it is especially important for policy makers to understand the 
complexity of what is happening at the community level and the importance of customary 
governance mechanisms in maintaining these systems as well as the diversity that 
sustains them. 
On the part of the community there is also a desperate need for educational 
efforts. There is a deep suspicion of this law, and outsider intentions within these 
communities, and improved communication pathways in addition to education is likely to 
chip away at these old wounds. Not only is there a deep suspicion of outsiders, but also 
a deep misunderstanding and hesitancy towards Western legal institutions and tools, 
including intellectual property rights. While some tools resonate better with 
communities than others (e.g. trademarks, local registers) it is important that communities 
have a better understanding of other Western legal tools and how they could be utilized to 
116 
support their interests and efforts in order to be empowered to make more informed 
decisions. At the same time, education and capacity building efforts in the importance of 
strengthening and traditional governance mechanisms would allow more communities to 
remain active in governing their resources. 
• Recognize and Enforce Traditional Customary Governance Mechanisms 
Given the integral role and function of traditional governance in the maintenance 
and conservation of traditional knowledge and genetic resources, it is imperative that any 
national law for the protection of traditional knowledge must strengthen rather than 
undermine these local mechanisms. Any system that does not account for these local 
systems is not likely to achieve the long-term objective of conserving traditional 
knowledge and genetic resources. 
The law should make use of the fact that Andean communities are generally rich 
in their capacities to govern their local resources, in fact this could be thought of as a 
facet of traditional knowledge in itself. It is evident that at the local level, it is 
conceptually impossible to separate traditional knowledge and genetic resources from the 
landscape and the cosmologies in which they are embedded, developed and conserved. It 
is thus necessary for any effective effort for the conservation of traditional knowledge to 
address not only the need to conserve these particular resources but also the complex 
systems in which they are situated. 
While it is recognized that communities themselves will play an important role in 
the conservation of these resources, the scope for state protection must be widened to 
incorporate other concerns. As the law is adapted it will need to reflect the fact that local 
ideas about the "protection" of these resources may differ from the Western ideas about 
the need to provide financial compensation for environmental services. From the 
perspective of these communities, protection should incorporate protecting day-to-day 
use of these crops, and to continue to maintain control of these resources within the 
community. At the very least, the Law for the Protection of Traditional Knowledge must 
be designed so that it does not undermine other aspects of the complex local system in its 
effort to protect these resources. 
Given that the purpose of this law is to benefit indigenous peoples, and its 
approach is to be as non-authoritarian as possible, there may be a possibility for 
meaningful co-management whereby the state legislation aids in the recognition and 
external enforcement of traditional governance mechanisms for the protection of 
traditional knowledge. 
• Institutional and Organizational Structures 
There is a need for new institutional and organizational structures to enable 
meaningful participation of indigenous communities in decision-making processes and to 
allow customary governance mechanisms to become part of the institutional structure for 
the protection of traditional knowledge in Peru. 
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Vertical Linkages 
It can be concluded that communities are not able to protect their resources from 
threats such as biopiracy on their own, and that there will be need for co-management of 
some sort with external actors to have their governance mechanisms enforced outside of 
the communities. One emerging possibility is the opportunity for communities to link 
more closely with the local and regional governments as Peru continues to implement its 
decentralization process. While there are concerns about the sharing of power and 
distribution of local governments, there does seem to be a greater level of trust and 
understanding with the local governments than with the state. Further consideration 
should be given to developing regional indigenous protocols derived from traditional 
governance mechanisms that could be implemented and enforced by the regional 
government. 
Horizontal Linkages 
On one hand it is evident that the laws reliance on "representative organizations" 
to make decisions on behalf of indigenous communities is not popular with the 
communities of the Potato Park. At the same time in order to minimize conflicts between 
communities sharing the same resources, and recognizing that there is not one indigenous 
law operating in communities across Peru, it is necessary that communities develop some 
way of communicating, collaborating and making collective decisions regarding shared 
knowledge and resources. 
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Recognizing the importance of community traditional governance mechanisms in 
this effort, one possibility is that communities come together to form an indigenous 
congress, or develop indigenous protocols as collective statements about how decisions 
regarding their collective knowledge and resources will be made. This type of 
organization, like the collective governance of the Potato Park, could be derived from 
customary legal principles and is therefore more likely to be compatible with these 
mechanisms. 
If communities are willing to work with the local and regional governments in 
this process, it may make sense for each region to develop an indigenous institution to 
provide this function. Communities organize across each district to create indigenous 
protocols, and the local government can be the link with the state in the effort to enforce 
these protocols. 
• Overcome Misunderstanding and Suspicion 
Given the high degree of misunderstanding and suspicion within the communities 
towards the state and state institutions, meaningful participation of indigenous peoples in 
the adaptation and implementation of this law may provide an extremely important 
opportunity for changing perceptions and attitudes regarding state-community 
collaboration. 
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Discussion of Findings: 
To conclude, the findings of this research paper suggest that the Peruvian Law for 
the Protection of Traditional Knowledge, in its current form, is likely to undermine 
customary governance mechanisms unless great efforts are taken in order to adapt this 
law to make it more compatible with the interests of indigenous communities. In order 
for the compatibility of the governance regimes to be improved, there will need to be 
meaningful involvement of indigenous peoples in the adaptation and implementation of 
this law; increased efforts for education and intercultural exchange amongst stakeholders 
(most urgently amongst policy makers and indigenous communities); respect and 
recognition of the importance of traditional customary governance mechanisms to the 
protection of biodiversity and traditional knowledge; creation of new institutional and 
organizational structures; and lastly trust building amongst stakeholders. 
The weaknesses of the current system may be ameliorated by strengthening the 
partnership of state and local actors in the governance of traditional knowledge and 
biodiversity. The theoretical arguments for community-based co-management were 
reviewed in the first chapter of the literature review. The basic rationale for this 
management strategy is to share power and responsibility amongst state and local 
resource users in order to draw upon the relative strengths and minimize the relative 
weaknesses of both centralized state control and local resource management functioning 
independently. The following chart summarizes the strengths, weaknesses, and 
feasibility of implementing a community- based co-management strategy. 
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Table 3: Overview of Community Based Co-Management 
Summary Chart: 
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Are the strengths and weaknesses of community-based co-management applicable 
to the governance of traditional knowledge and biodiversity in Peru? 
Findings of this study indicate that in theory many of the weaknesses of the 
current access and benefit-sharing regime in Peru could be improved by the successful 
implementation of a community based co-management regime. One of the theoretical 
strengths of a co-management regime is that co-management regimes continue to adapt in 
a co-evolutionary process of mutual learning. Given the nature of the resources at hand, 
as entities that will continue to change and evolve over time, as well as the fluid and 
flexible nature of customary governance mechanisms it is imperative that the elements of 
a national governance system must also be capable of adapting and changing over time 
through a process of co-learning. 
Secondly co-management theorists propose that these governance systems are 
likely to reduce the risk of conflict between social actors. This strength is particularly 
relevant to the current ABS system in Peru, as one of the major concerns expressed at the 
level of the community was that changes in the national governance of these resources 
might result in increased conflict within and between communities. Ultimately any 
system designed to effectively protect these resources must contain conflict resolution 
mechanisms and joint decision making structures that are equitable and democratic. 
Further, co-governance system that is capable of incorporating multiple knowledge 
systems is imperative, as the vitality of traditional knowledge and biodiversity at the 
community level is entirely dependent on the ability of traditional knowledge systems to 
continue to evolve over time. 
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Finally, co-management theorists propose that these regimes are capable of 
drawing upon community resource management capacities including time and place 
specific knowledge. As many indigenous communities are extremely rich in their own 
capacities to manage their knowledge and biodiversity it is logical that the state should 
play a supportive role in protecting and strengthening community governance 
mechanisms, while helping to create a system to apply community governance 
mechanisms outside of the community, in order to minimize conflict between 
communities and at the same time to protect communities from external misappropriation 
of their resources. 
Co-management theory also addresses some weaknesses of this approach. A 
major criticism is that in a worst-case scenario the partnership arrangement may be 
coercive in nature and the risk that the rhetoric of co-management may be used to justify 
a redistribution of responsibility without any real redistribution of power and resources. 
Therefore, in order for a co-management approach to succeed in the management of 
traditional knowledge and biodiversity, it will require political willingness and good 
intentions on the part of the state to continue to provide the necessary logistical, financial 
and technical and institutional support for community efforts. 
Would a co-management system be beneficial for state actors? 
The theory of co-management proposes that it is most advantageous for state's to 
enter into co-management arrangements when a number of factors exist including: that 
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local actors historically held rights to the resources in question; that local interests rely 
upon the successful management of resources; that controversial decisions will need to be 
made; when resource conservation necessitates the linking of various knowledge systems, 
cosmologies and values; and finally when adequate time and resources are available to 
design, facilitate and implement an effective co-management system. Many of these 
factors are present in the current situation in Peru. Traditional governance mechanisms 
have been responsible for the successful management and conservation of the resources 
in question, and rely heavily on the well being of these resources for their very survival. 
The recent changes in biodiversity governance in Peru have been extremely controversial, 
and ongoing decisions regarding bio prospecting and the implementation of this law are 
likely to result in a very diverse, and highly emotional range of opinions amongst 
stakeholders. Undoubtedly, the successful management of biodiversity and traditional 
knowledge will require the linking of various knowledge systems, cosmologies and 
values, between communities and the state, as well as amongst communities and 
individual community members holding a diverse range of beliefs. While many of these 
factors are present, a major limitation, even if the Peruvian government is willing to enter 
into a co-management arrangement, is likely to be the adequate time and resources to 
design, facilitate an implement such a system. Indigenous peoples were left out of the 
design for the law that stands now, largely as a result of severely limited time and funds 
available to create this regime. The adaptation and implementation of a successful 
system will require an increased source of funding. 
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Would a community based co-management system be advantageous for 
communities? 
Co-management theory proposes that community participation is most 
advantageous when: powerful actors are encroaching on resources traditionally held by 
communities; external factors undermine traditional governance mechanisms; and when 
local governance mechanisms are no longer able to manage resources alone. These 
factors are very relevant to the current situation facing the communities of the Potato 
Park. These communities are facing new threats from outside the community including 
biopiracy, which are beyond the scope of their customary governance mechanisms. While 
these mechanisms are still effective and relevant for the conservation and maintenance of 
these resources, it is quite difficult for these communities to enforce their local 
governance mechanisms outside of the community without external support. 
Community Based Co-Management Approach: Capitalizing on the Strengths and 
Minimizing the Weaknesses of Local and National Governance Mechanisms 
The current national ABS system, namely the Law for the Protection of 
Traditional Knowledge in Peru, has both strengths and weaknesses, which in theory, 
could be improved by entering into meaningful institutional partnerships with community 
authorities. For example, while the current approach provides mechanisms intended to 
prevent biopiracy and to share benefits with local communities, its implementation may 
undermine local decision-making authority. On the other hand, it is also evident that 
community based approaches functioning independently are also likely to result in 
significant strengths and weaknesses. For example, the customary governance 
mechanisms of the Potato Park are critical to providing a holistic conservation approach 
based on the customary governance mechanisms of these communities, but at the same 
time these mechanisms are relatively ineffective for enforcing compliance of outsiders 
and solving disputes with other communities sharing similar resources. Therefore a 
community based co-management approach is advocated in order to initiate an ongoing 
problem solving process drawing on the relative strengths and minimizing the relative 
weaknesses of the two tiers of governance. 
More specifically, the "co-management as a network" framework is a particularly 
useful conceptualization for thinking about how the ABS system in Peru can bring 
together a wide range of actors to contribute in various capacities to the governance of 
traditional knowledge and agro-biodiversity in Peru. While this approach does focus 
primarily on the strengthening of state-community partnerships, and shifting power and 
principle decision-making authority to communities, it also provides intellectual space for 
considering the importance of other relevant actors. In this case, it is imperative to 
recognize diversities and complexities within the state, as well as within and between 
local level actors. Any successful attempt at co-management of agro-biodiversity and 
traditional knowledge in Peru will require a nuanced understanding of the relationship 
between a wide variety of state and local actors, including formal centralized state bodies, 
local and regional governments, indigenous organizations, grassroots NGOs, and the 
diverse range of community authorities across Peru. 
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Is a community-based co-management system feasible? 
A quote by Berkes provided in the second chapter of this paper is particularly 
useful for assessing the appropriateness of implementing a community based co-
management approach: 
Assuming that co-management is desirable and there is a need for it, and 
assuming that devolution of management power is possible and feasible, 
then four key conditions seem to define successful co-management: Are 
there appropriate institutions, both local and governmental? Is there trust 
between the actors? Is there legal protection of local rights? Are there 
incentives for local communities to conserve their resources? (Berkes, 
1997). 
Findings of this study suggest that a successful community based co-management 
system would necessitate the creation of new institutions both at the local and national 
level. This study suggests that the current institutions are not appropriate mechanisms for 
representing indigenous peoples and facilitating collaborative decision making, and that 
new institutional and organizational structures will be needed to truly represent 
indigenous peoples, to minimize inter-community conflict and to facilitate collective and 
meaningful participatory involvement of indigenous peoples. The issue of trust between 
actors is also of critical importance to the feasibility of a co-management system in Peru. 
While it is evident that there is still a great deal of mistrust between formal centralized 
state institutions and indigenous communities, evidence suggests that local and regional 
governments are perceived in a much more positive light. A successful co-management 
approach may also help to mend relations between the state and communities. While the 
law for Protection of Traditional Knowledge does provide some allowance for 
communities to manage their knowledge and agro-biodiversity, it needs to go farther 
allowing communities to take on active and meaningful decision-making roles based on 
their customary governance institutions. Addressing Berkes final factor predicting the 
feasibility of co-management, this study suggests that the communities of the Potato Park 
have extremely strong incentives to conserve not only their traditional knowledge and 
agro-biodiversity. So while there are likely to be significant challenges in the creation 
and implementation of a community-based co-management regime including allocating 
time and resources, ensuring political willingness, creation of appropriate institutions 
linking local and national actors, and building trust amongst actors, it is promising that 
many of the factors predicting the usefulness and feasibility of a community based co-
management regime are present in the current situation. As reviewed above, there are 
many reasons for both state and local actors to justify entering into such a partnership and 
if implemented in a meaningful and effective fashion a successful co-management regime 
that starts from the ground up decentralizing decision making authority to communities, 
may offer real solutions to both local and national interests. 
Regardless of the nature of the management regime governing traditional 
knowledge and genetic resources, ongoing negotiations and decisions must recognize and 
make use of the concept of biocultural heritage. Future international and national thinking 
on Access and Benefit Sharing must acknowledge the fact that these resources cannot be 
viewed as independent and neutral commodities to be bought and sold in the marketplace, 
as the integrity of these resources will be lost if conservation efforts are separated from 
the holistic conservation of the landscapes, worldviews, and conservation practices in 
which they were developed and maintained for thousands of years. Access and benefit 
sharing regimes must expand their focus to the holistic protection of not only the 
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traditional knowledge and genetic resources of indigenous communities but also 
expanding this vision to include a deep respect for the "knowledge, innovations, and 
practices of indigenous peoples and local communities which are collectively held and 
inextricably linked to resources and territories; including the variety of genes, varieties, 
species and ecosystems; cultural and spiritual values; and customary laws shaped within 
the socio-ecological context of communities" (Swiderska, 2006). A reframing of Access 
and Benefit Sharing regimes to accommodate the concept of Biocultural Heritage is 
central for the ability of these regimes to contribute to the goals of sustainable 
development as defined in this thesis: a complex and multi-faceted concept including 
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Appendix A: Standardized Interview Guide 
Semi Structured, Open-Ended Interview: 
Interview Questions: 
1. What is the mandate of your organization? 
2. What is the mandate of your particular program? 
3. What is your role in the organization? 
4. Is your organization a stakeholder in the development of a national ABS system? Why or why not? 
5. Is your organization a stakeholder in the development of law, policy and/or programs or projects for the protection 
of traditional knowledge specifically? 
6. What are the main interests/ priorities of your organization with regard to the development and implementation of 
the Peru's national ABS legal framework? 
7. What are the main interests /priorities of your organization with regard to the protection of traditional knowledge? 
8. To what extent is access to and use of traditional knowledge and associated biological and genetic resources are 
governed by the customary laws and practices of indigenous and local communities? 
9. Indigenous peoples and local communities have argued that protection of traditional knowledge should be carried out 
in accordance with customary 
law? What do you feel about this claim? Is it achievable? 
10. In your view, what is the relationship between the national ABS regime, and law for the protection of traditional 
knowledge, and customary governance of genetic resources and traditional knowledge? 
11. To what extent does or might the current legal framework recognise and respect customary law? 
12. How might the current legal framework threaten customary law practices? 
13. What potential exists for developing a national framework that harmonizes the customary governance mechanisms 
of indigenous communities with the national ABS framework? 
14. Are you aware of any experiences involving collaboration between traditional or local community authorities and 
national authorities in the application of customary law and authority in cases of resource management or otherwise, 
which might? 
15. What are the main constraints to harmonizing local and national governance mechanisms? 
16. From the perspective of your organization, what measures might be taken in order to ensure that community 
governance mechanisms be recognised, respected and/or strengthened by the national ABS framework? Does your 
organisation have any responsibility in this area? Why or why not? What responsibility lies with the government, 
communities or other stakeholders in this area. 
17. In the long term what form of protection should be given to traditional knowledge and how might this be 
implemented? 
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Appendix B: Text from Power-point Presentation with the Barefoot Technicians 
Slide 1 
Welcome and Thank you for Coming 
My name is Emily Taylor 




Introduction to my research 
Ask permission to see if all people here today are willing to participate in today's discussion 
Discussion of issues related to the Potato Park's governance of Traditional Knowledge and Genetic Diversity 
Planning for the General Assembly next week 
Slide 3 
Multi-Level Governance of Traditional Knowledge and Genetic Resources in Peru 
Understanding the Compatibility of the National Law for the Protection of Traditional Knowledge, and the Local 
Governance Mechanisms of the Potato Park 
Multi-tiered Governance of Agro- Biodiversity 
Slide 4 
How will changes in the national governance of traditional knowledge and genetic resources impact the ways in which 
communities in Peru are currently using, maintaining, conserving and making decisions regarding their resources? 
Slide 5 
Why is it Important to Understand the Perspective of the Potato Park? 
Because this law will impact the way in which traditional knowledge and genetic resources are governed in Peru. 
Because indigenous communities had very little participation in the development of this law 
Slide 6 
-Because although this law has been passed, it has not been implemented and it will continue to change and adapt. I 
hope to share the results of my research with the potato park with national policy makers in Lima, as well as at 
international conferences. 
Because the Potato Park, provides a very important example for the world. It demonstrates how communities can use 
traditional laws and principles to govern their genetic resources and traditional knowledge. In my opinion national and 
international laws must respect these traditional laws and practices. 
Slide 7 
Law for the Protection of Traditional Knowledge (1996) 
I will be exploring specifically how this law will impact the ways in which communities are currently governing their 
own traditional knowledge and resources. 
Slide 8 
Introduction to Law for the Protection of Traditional Knowledge 
First national law protecting Traditional Knowledge in the world. It applies specifically to traditional knowledge 
applicable to genetic resources. 
Applies western principles and tools, for protecting traditional knowledge (eg. registers, licenses, trade secrets) 
Proponents of this law, see it as an ongoing process, that will need to be adjusted and improved during its 
implementation process. 
Slide 9 
Primary Objectives of the Law for the Protection of Traditional Knowledge 
Ensuring a degree of control by communities over the use of their knowledge and receive benefits from outside users 
Preventing biopiracy through the use of the patent system to protect traditional knowledge 
Slide 10 
General Principles 
Prior Informed Consent- outsiders interested in using TK, must obtain PIC from representative organizations 
Benefit Sharing- representative organizations will negotiate payments for outsiders use of TK. A percentage of the 
Royalty rates will be deposited into a Fund for the Development of Indigenous Peoples 
The law says that the Fund will be administered by the representative organizations and will be used to improve the 
living conditions of indigenous communities in Peru. The Fund will receive resources from the state, international 
donor organizations, and from benefits received from the exchange of traditional knowledge and genetic resources. 
Slide 11 
Proposed Tools for the Protection of Traditional Knowledge 
Licenses (Contracts)- negotiated by representative organizations and registered with INDECOPI, these licenses 
establish the conditions under which traditional knowledge may be accessed and utilized by outsiders 




How will the registers Function? 
-They will provide defensive protection to prevent wrongful patents. The registers will be used by INDECOPI to prove 
prior art, or prior existence of knowledge and resources. 
- The registers will aid in the preservation and maintenance of collective knowledge of communities. 
Slide 13 
3 Types of Registers 
-National Public Register- This register will be developed and implemented by INDECOPI and will contain traditional 
knowledge already in the public domain and will be used to provide defensive protection against biopiracy. 
-National Confidential Register- This register will also be developed and implemented by INDECOPI and will contain 
that information which communities would like to remain private. It will also be used to provide defensive protection. 
-Local Registers- Local Registers based on traditional customs and laws. 
Slide 14 
How will communities participate? 
According to the law: Due to the collective nature of indigenous communities, indigenous peoples must exercise their 
rights through their representative organizations, which are structured in harmony with traditional forms of 
community organization. 
Slide 15 
My Research Question 
How might this law support or contradict community governance mechanisms for the protection of genetic resources 
and traditional knowledge of the potato park? 
Slide 16 
Questions for Discussion: 
What does it mean to you, to protect the traditional knowledge and genetic resources of the Potato Park? 
Slidel 7 
Questions for Discussion 
What does it mean to benefit from the use of traditional knowledge and genetic resources? 
Slide 18 
What sort of benefits would be expected when sharing resources with outsiders? 
How should this agreement be negotiated 
Slide 19 
Questions for Discussion: 
Does the Potato Park have a representative organization? 
How are members of the potato park represented in national politics? 
Slide 20 
Questions for Discussion: 
Who should represent members of the potato park in negotiations regarding outsider's use of their traditional 
knowledge and genetic resources? 
Slide 21 
Question for Discussion: 
If another community entered into an agreement with an outsider, granting access to traditional knowledge and genetic 
resources that are also contained in the potato park communities: How should conflicts be resolved? 
Slide 22 
Questions for Discussion: 
Is it important that local customary governance mechanisms are protected by national laws in Peru? 
Slide 23 
Question for Discussion: 
What is the best way to ensure that local customary governance mechanisms are protected? 
Slide 24 
General Assembly- What I would like to ask community members 
What does it mean to the community to protect traditional knowledge? 
What does it mean to the community to protect genetic resources? 
How should the community decide whether to share traditional knowledge and genetic resources with outsiders? 
What sort of benefits should the community receive? 
Is it necessary for national laws to protect the Potato Park's traditional governance mechanisms? 
How can communities across Peru work together, to make decisions regarding their collective knowledge and 
resources? 
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Appendix C: Consent Form 
Consent Form 
Researcher: Emily Taylor 
emily_taylor7@hotmail.com 
International Development Studies, Saint Mary's University 
Halifax, Nova Scotia, B3H 3C3 
Dear Participant, 
For my Master's thesis research I am conducting a study on Access and Benefit Sharing Legislation in Peru. 
Specifically, I am interested in understanding from many perspectives if and how traditional community governance 
mechanisms can by protected by National Access and Benefit Sharing Legislation. 
Beyond identifying the opportunities and constraints, research will focus on gathering the perspectives of multiple 
stakeholders on why constraints exist. The overall objective of this study is to provide some possible recommendations 
on how the compatibility of national ABS policies and local sui generis legislation, could be strengthened, recognizing 
both national government priorities and the interests of indigenous communities. 
I hope to conduct interviews with individuals from various stakeholder groups in Peru who have been involved in ABS 
policy making both at the National level and at the community level. 
For those who agree to participate in this study, an interview will be arranged at a time and place of the interviewees' 
convenience. A set of questions will be asked, to try to understand the perspective of that individual, as well as the 
perspective of that individual's organization or community. When necessary a translator will aid in the interview 
process. 
Participation in this study is entirely optional and voluntary. You may opt out of the study at any points. Participants 
should only answer those questions that they feel comfortable answering. If you agree to participate both the translator 
and myself promise that your identity and responses to the questions will remain entirely confidential. The final report 
of my research will not contain any identifying information of individual participants. 
The final report will be made available upon request. If you agree to take part in this study, according to the conditions 





PODER LEGISLATIVO CONGRESO DE LA REPUBLICA 
LEY N° 27811 
EL PRESIDENTE DE LA REPUBLICA 
POR CUANTO: 
La Comision Permanente del Congreso de la Republica ha dado la Ley siguiente: 
LA COMISION PERMANENTE DEL CONGRESO DE LA REPUBLICA; 
Ha dado la Ley siguiente: 
LEY QUE ESTABLECE EL REGIMEN DE PROTECCION DE LOS CONOCIMIENTOS 
COLECTIVOS DE LOS PUEBLOS INDIGENAS VINCULADOS A LOS RECURSOS 
BIOLOGICOS 
TITULOI 
DEL RECONOCIMIENTO DE DERECHOS DE LOS PUEBLOS INDIGENAS SOBRE SUS 
CONOCIMIENTOS COLECTIVOS 
Articulo 1".- Reconocimiento de derechos 
El Estado peruano reconoce el derecho y la facultad de los pueblos y comunidades indigenas de decidir 
sobre sus conocimientos colectivos. 
TITULO II 
DE LAS DEFINICIONES 
Articulo 2".- Definieiones 
Para los efectos del presente dispositivo se entendera por: 
a) Pueblos indigenas.- Son pueblos originarios que tienen derechos anteriores a la formation del Estado 
peruano, mantienen una cultura propia, un espacio territorial y se autorreconocen como tales. En estos se 
incluye a los pueblos en aislamiento voluntario o no contactados, asi como a las comunidades campesinas y 
nativas. 
La denomination "indigenas" comprende y puede emplearse como sinonimo de "originarios", 
"tradicionales", "etnicos", "ancestrales", "nativos" u otros vocablos. 
b) Conocimiento colectivo.- Conocimiento acumulado y transgeneracional desarrollado por los pueblos y 
comunidades indigenas respecto a las propiedades, usos y caracteristicas de la diversidad biologica. 
El componente intangible contemplado en la Decision 391 de la Comision del Acuerdo de Cartagena 
incluye este tipo de conocimiento colectivo. 
c) Consentimiento informado previo.- Autorizacion otorgada, dentro del marco del presente regimen de 
protection, por la organizacion representativa de los pueblos indigenas poseedores de un conocimiento 
colectivo, de conformidad con las normas por ellos reconocidas, para la realization de determinada 
actividad que implique acceder y utilizar dicho conocimiento colectivo, previo suministro de suficiente 
information relativa a los propositos, riesgos o implicancias de dicha actividad, incluyendo los eventuales 
usos del conocimiento y, de ser el caso, el valor del mismo. 
d) Contrato de licencia de uso de conocimientos colectivos.- Acuerdo expreso celebrado entre la 
organizacion representativa de los pueblos indigenas poseedores de un conocimiento colectivo y un tercero 
que incorpora terminos y condiciones sobre el uso de dicho conocimiento colectivo. 
Estos contratos pueden constituir un anexo al contrato mencionado en el Articulo 34° de la Decision 391 de 
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la Comision del Acuerdo de Cartagena que establece un Regimen Comun sobre acceso a los recursos 
geneticos. 
e) Recursos biologicos.- Recursos geneticos, organismos o partes de ellos, poblaciones, o cualquier otro 
tipo del componente biotico de los ecosistemas 
de valor o utilidad real o potencial para la humanidad. 
TITULO III 
DEL AMBITO DE PROTECCION 
Articulo 3".- Ambito de proteccion de la norma 
El presente dispositivo establece un regimen especial de proteccion de los conocimientos colectivos de los 
pueblos indigenas vinculados a los recursos biologicos. 
Articulo 4".- Excepciones al regimen 
El presente regimen no afectara el intercambio tradicional entre pueblos indigenas de los conocimientos 
colectivos protegidos bajo este regimen. 
TITULO IV 
DE LOS OBJETIVOS 
Articulo 5°.- Objetivos del regimen 
Son objetivos del presente regimen: 
a) Promover el respeto, la proteccion, la preservation, la aplicacion mas amplia y el desarrollo de los 
conocimientos colectivos de los pueblos indigenas. 
b) Promover la distribution justa y equitativa de los beneficios derivados de la utilization de estos 
conocimientos colectivos. 
c) Promover el uso de estos conocimientos en beneficio de los pueblos indigenas y de la humanidad. 
d) Garantizar que el uso de los conocimientos colectivos se realice con el consentimiento informado previo 
de los pueblos indigenas. 
e) Promover el fortalecimiento y el desarrollo de las capacidades de los pueblos indigenas y de los 
mecanismos tradicionalmente empleados por ellos para compartir y distribuir beneficios generados 
colectivamente, en el marco del presente regimen. 
f) Evitar que se concedan patentes a invenciones obtenidas o desarrolladas a partir de conocimientos 
colectivos de los pueblos indigenas del Peru, sin que 
se tomen en cuenta estos conocimientos como antecedentes en el examen de novedad y nivel inventivo de 
dichas invenciones. 
TITULO V 
DE LOS PRINCIPIOS GENERALES 
Articulo 6".- Condiciones para el acceso a los conocimientos colectivos 
Los interesados en acceder a los conocimientos colectivos con fines de aplicacion cientifica, comercial e 
industrial deberan solicitar el consentimiento informado previo de las organizaciones representativas de los 
pueblos indigenas 
que posean un conocimiento colectivo. 
La organization representativa de los pueblos indigenas, cuyo consentimiento informado previo haya sido 
solicitado, debera informar que esta entrando en una negotiation al mayor numero posible de pueblos 
indigenas poseedores del conocimiento y tomar en cuenta sus intereses e inquietudes, en particular aquellas 
vinculadas con sus valores espirituales o creencias religiosas. 
La information que proporcione se limitara al recurso biologico sobre el cual versa el conocimiento 
colectivo objeto de la negotiation en curso, en salvaguarda de los intereses de la contraparte en mantener 
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secretos los detalles de la negotiation. 
Articulo 7°.- Acceso con fines de aplicacion comercial o industrial 
En caso de acceso con fines de aplicacion comercial o industrial, se debera suscribir una licencia donde se 
prevean condiciones para una adecuada retribution por dicho acceso y se garantice una distribution 
equitativa de los beneficios derivados del mismo. 
Articulo 8".- Porcentaje destinado al Fondo para el Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indigenas 
Se destinara un porcentaje no menor al 10% del valor de las ventas brutas, antes de impuestos, resultantes 
de la comercializacion de los productos desarrollados a partir de un conocimiento colectivo al Fondo para 
el Desarrollo de los Pueblos 
Indigenas a que se refieren los Articulos 37° y siguientes. 
Las partes podran acordar un porcentaje mayor, en funcion del grado de utilization o incorporation directa 
de dichos conocimientos en el producto final resultante, el grado de aporte de dichos conocimientos a la 
reduction de los costos de investigation y desarrollo de los productos derivados, entre otros. 
Articulo 9".- Rol de las generaciones presentes 
Las generaciones presentes de los pueblos indigenas preservan, desarrollan y administran sus 
conocimientos colectivos en beneficio propio y de las generaciones futuras. 
Articulo 10°.- Naturaleza colectiva de los conocimientos 
Los conocimientos colectivos protegidos bajo este regimen son aquellos que pertenecen a un pueblo 
indigena y no a individuos determinados que formen parte de dicho pueblo. Pueden pertenecer a varios 
pueblos indigenas. 
Estos derechos son independientes de aquellos que puedan generarse al interior de los pueblos indigenas y 
para cuyo efecto de distribution de beneficios podran apelar a sus sistemas tradicionales. 
Articulo 11°.- Conocimientos colectivos y patrimonio cultural 
Los conocimientos colectivos forman parte del patrimonio cultural de los pueblos indigenas. 
Articulo 12".- Inalienabilidad e imprescriptibilidad de los derechos 
Por ser parte de su patrimonio cultural, los derechos de los pueblos indigenas sobre sus conocimientos 
colectivos son inalienables e imprescriptibles. 
Articulo 13°.- Conocimientos colectivos que estan en el dominio publico 
A efectos del presente regimen, se entendera que un conocimiento colectivo se encuentra en el dominio 
publico cuando haya sido accesible a personas ajenas a los pueblos indigenas, a traves de medios de 
comunicacion masiva, tales como publicaciones, o cuando se refiera a propiedades, usos o caracteristicas 
de un recurso biologico que sean conocidos masivamente fuera del ambito de los pueblos y comunidades 
indigenas. 
En los casos en que estos conocimientos hayan entrado en el dominio publico en los ultimos 20 afios, se 
destinara un porcentaje del valor de las ventas brutas, antes de impuestos, resultantes de la comercializacion 
de los productos 
desarrollados a partir de estos conocimientos colectivos, al Fondo para el Desarrollo de los Pueblos 
Indigenas a que se refieren los Articulos 37° y siguientes. 
Articulo 14".- Representantes de los pueblos indigenas 
Para efectos de este regimen, los pueblos indigenas deberan ser representados a traves de sus 
organizaciones representativas, respetando las formas tradicionales de organization de los pueblos 
indigenas. 
TITULO VI 
DE LOS REGISTROS DE CONOCIMIENTOS 
COLECTIVOS DE LOS PUEBLOS INDIGENAS 
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Articulo 15°.- Registros de Conocimientos Colectivos de los Pueblos Indigenas 
Los conocimientos colectivos de los pueblos indigenas podran ser inscritos en tres tipos de registros: 
a) Registro Nacional Publico de Conocimientos Colectivos de los Pueblos Indigenas. 
b) Registro Nacional Confidential de Conocimientos Colectivos de los Pueblos Indigenas. 
c) Registros Locales de Conocimientos Colectivos de los Pueblos indigenas. 
El Registro Nacional Publico de Conocimientos Colectivos 
de los Pueblos Indigenas y el Registro Nacional Confidential de Conocimientos Colectivos de los Pueblos 
Indigenas estaran a cargo del Indecopi. 
Articulo 16".- Objeto de los Registros de Conocimientos Colectivos 
Los Registros de Conocimientos Colectivos de los Pueblos Indigenas tienen por objeto, segiin sea el caso: 
a) Preservar y salvaguardar los conocimientos colectivos de los pueblos indigenas y sus derechos sobre 
ellos; y 
b) Proveer al Indecopi de information que le permita la defensa de los intereses de los pueblos indigenas, 
con relation a sus conocimientos colectivos. 
Articulo 17°.- Caracter del Registro Nacional Publico de Conocimientos Colectivos de los Pueblos 
Indigenas 
El Registro Nacional Publico de Conocimientos Colectivos de los Pueblos Indigenas contendra los 
conocimientos colectivos que se encuentran en el dominio publico. 
El Indecopi debera registrar los conocimientos colectivos que estan en el dominio publico en el Registro 
Nacional Publico de Conocimientos Colectivos de los Pueblos Indigenas. 
Articulo 18".- Caracter del Registro Nacional Confidential de Conocimientos Colectivos de los 
Pueblos Indigenas 
El Registro Nacional Confidential de Conocimientos Colectivos de los Pueblos Indigenas no podra ser 
consultado por terceros. 
Articulo 19".- Registro a solicitud de los pueblos indigenas 
Cada pueblo, a traves de su organization representativa, podra inscribir ante el Indecopi, en el Registro 
National Publico o en el Registro Nacional Confidential, los conocimientos colectivos que posea. 
Articulo 20°.- Solicitudes de registro de conocimientos colectivos 
Las solicitudes de registro de conocimientos colectivos de los pueblos indigenas se presentaran ante el 
Indecopi, a traves de sus organizaciones representativas, y deberan contener: 
a) Identification del pueblo indigena que solicita el registro de sus conocimientos; 
b) Identification del representante; 
c) Indication del recurso biologico sobre el cual versa el conocimiento colectivo, pudiendo utilizarse el 
nombre indigena; 
d) Indication del uso o usos que se dan al recurso biologico en cuestion; 
e) Description clara y completa del conocimiento colectivo objeto de registro; y 
f) Acta en la que figura el acuerdo de registrar el conocimiento por parte del pueblo indigena. 
La solicitud debera ser acompanada de una muestra del recurso biologico sobre el cual versa el 
conocimiento colectivo objeto de registro. En aquellos casos en que la muestra sea de dificil transporte o 
manipulation, el pueblo indigena que solicita el registro podra requerir al Indecopi que le exima de la 
presentation de dicha muestra y le permita presentar, en su lugar, fotografias en las que se puedan apreciar 
las caracteristicas del recurso biologico sobre el cual versa el conocimiento colectivo. Dicha muestra, o en 
su caso, dichas fotografias, deberan permitir al Indecopi identificar de manera fehaciente el recurso 
biologico en cuestion y hacer constar en el expediente el nombre cientifico del mismo. 
Articulo 21°.- Tramite de la solicitud 
El Indecopi verificara, en el plazo de diez (10) dias de presentada la solicited, que la misma consigne todos 
los datos especificados en el articulo anterior. 
En caso de que se haya producido alguna omision, notificara al pueblo indigena que solicita el registro a 
efectos de que complete la solicitud, dentro del plazo de seis (6) meses, prorrogables a su solicited, bajo 
apercibimiento de declarar el abandono de la solicited. 
Una vez que el Indecopi haya verificado que la solicitud consigne todos los datos especificados en el 
articulo anterior, procedera a registrar el conocimiento colectivo en cuestion. 
Articulo 22".- Envio de representatives del Indecopi 
Para facilitar el registro de conocimientos colectivos de los pueblos indigenas, el Indecopi podra enviar 
representantes debidamente acreditados a los diferentes pueblos indigenas con el fin de recabar la 
informacion necesaria para dar tramite 
a las solicitudes de registro que deseen presentar. 
Articulo 23°.- Obligacion del Indecopi de enviar la informacion contenida en el Registro Nacional 
Publico a las principales Oficinas de Patentes del mundo 
Con el fin de objetar solicitudes de patente en tramite, cuestionar patentes concedidas o influir en general 
en el otorgamiento de patentes relacionadas con productos o procesos obtenidos o desarrollados a partir de 
un conocimiento colectivo, el Indecopi debera enviar la informacion contenida en el Registro Nacional 
Publico, a las principales Oficinas de Patentes del mundo, a efectos de que sea tomada en cuenta como 
antecedente en el examen de novedad y nivel inventivo de las solicitudes de patente. 
Articulo 24".- Registros Locales de Conocimientos Colectivos de los Pueblos Indigenas 
Los pueblos indigenas podran organizar Registros Locales de Conocimientos Colectivos, de conformidad 
con sus usos y costumbres. El Indecopi prestara asistencia tecnica para la organizacion de estos registros, a 
solicited de los pueblos indigenas. 
TITULO VII 
DE LAS LICENCIAS 
Articulo 25°.- Inscription obligatoria de contratos de licencia 
Los contratos de licencia deberan inscribirse en un registro que para estos efectos llevara el Indecopi. 
Articulo 26".- Obligatoriedad de forma escrita de los contratos de licencia 
La organizacion representativa de los pueblos indigenas que poseen un onocimiento colectivo podra otorgar 
a terceras personas licencias de uso de dicho conocimiento colectivo solo mediante contrato escrito, en 
idioma nativo y castellano, y por un plazo renovable no menor de un ano ni mayor de 3 aiios. 
Articulo 27°.- Contenido del contrato de licencia 
A efectos del presente regimen, los contratos deberan contener por lo menos las siguientes clausulas: 
a) Identification de las partes. 
b) Description del conocimiento colectivo objeto del contrato. 
c) El establecimiento de las compensaciones que recibiran los pueblos indigenas por el uso de su 
conocimiento colectivo. Estas compensaciones incluiran un pago inicial monetario u otro equivalente 
dirigido a su desarrollo sostenible; y un porcentaje no menor del 5% del valor de las ventas brutas, antes de 
impuestos, resultantes de la comercializacion de los productos desarrollados directa e indirectamente a 
partir de 
dicho conocimiento colectivo, de ser el caso. 
d) El suministro de suficiente informacion relativa a los propositos, riesgos o implicancias de dicha 
actividad, incluyendo los eventuales usos del conocimiento 
colectivo y, de ser el caso, el valor del mismo. 
e) La obligacion del licenciatario de informar periodicamente, en terminos generales, al licenciante acerca 
de los avances en la investigation, industrialization y comercializacion de los productos desarrollados a 
partir de los conocimientos colectivos objeto de la licencia. 
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f) La obligation del licenciatario de contribuir al fortalecimiento de las capacidades de los pueblos 
indigenas en relation con sus conocimientos colectivos vinculados a los recursos biologicos. 
En caso de que en el contrato se pacte un deber de reserva, el mismo debera constar expresamente. 
El Indecopi no registrara los contratos que no se ajusten a lo establecido en este articulo. 
Articulo 28°.- Solicitudes de registro de contrato de licencia. Confidencialidad del contrato 
Las solicitudes de registro de un contrato de licencia que se presenten ante el Indecopi deberan contener: 
a) Identification de los pueblos indigenas que son parte en el contrato y de sus representantes; 
b) Identification de las demas partes en el contrato y de sus representantes. 
c) Copia del contrato; y 
d) Acta en la que figura el acuerdo de celebrar el contrato de licencia por parte de los pueblos indigenas que 
son parte en el contrato. 
El contrato no podra ser consultado por terceros, salvo con autorizacion expresa de ambas partes. 
Articulo 29".- Tramite de la solicitud 
El Indecopi verificara, en el plazo de diez (10) dias de presentada la solicitud, que la solicitud consigne 
todos los datos especificados en el articulo anterior. 
En caso de que se haya producido alguna omision, notificara a quien solicita el registro a efectos de que 
complete la solicitud, dentro del plazo de seis (6) meses, prorrogables a su solicitud, bajo apercibimiento de 
declarar el abandono de la solicitud. 
Articulo 30".- Verification del contenido del contrato 
A efectos de inscribir una licencia, el Indecopi, dentro del plazo de treinta (30) dias de presentada la 
solicitud, verificara si se cumplen las clausulas mencionadas en el Articulo 27°. 
Articulo 31".- Information adicional acerca del impacto ambiental 
El Indecopi, a solicitud de parte, o de oficio, solicitara information adicional, en aquellos casos en que 
considere que exista el riesgo de afectar el equilibrio ambiental en los territorios que habitan los pueblos 
indigenas como consecuencia del contrato cuyo registro se solicita. El registro del contrato sera denegado 
de verificarse dicho riesgo y en caso de que las partes no se comprometan a tomar las medidas necesarias 
para evitarlo, a satisfaction de la Autoridad Nacional Competente en materia de medio ambiente. 
Articulo 32°.- Alcance de las licencias de uso 
La licencia de uso de conocimiento colectivo de un pueblo indigena no impedira a otros utilizarlo ni otorgar 
licencias sobre este mismo conocimiento. Esta licencia tampoco afectara el derecho de las generaciones 
presentes y futuras de seguir utilizando y desarrollando conocimientos colectivos. 
Articulo 33".- Prohibition de conceder sublicencias 
Solo se podran conceder sublicencias con autorizacion expresa de la organization representativa de los 
pueblos indigenas que otorga la licencia. 
TITULO VIII 
DE LA CANCELACION DE REGISTRO 
Articulo 34".- Causales de cancelation de registro 
El Indecopi podra cancelar, de oficio o a solicitud de parte, un registro de conocimiento colectivo o de 
licencia de uso, previa audiencia de las partes interesadas, siempre que: 
a) Haya sido concedido en contravention de cualquiera de las disposiciones del presente regimen. 
b) Se compruebe que los datos esenciales contenidos en la solicitud son falsos o inexactos. 
Las acciones de cancelation que se deriven del presente articulo podran iniciarse en cualquier momento. 
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Articulo 35".- Solicitud de cancelacion de registro 
La solicitud de cancelacion de registro debera consignar o adjuntar, segun el caso, lo siguiente: 
a) Identificacion de quien solicita la cancelacion; 
b) Identificacion del representante o apoderado, de ser el caso; 
c) Registro materia de la cancelacion; 
d) Indicacion del fundamento legal de la action; 
e) Pruebas que acrediten las causales de cancelacion invocadas; 
f) Domicilio donde se notificara al titular del registro cuya cancelacion se solicita; 
g) En su caso, copia de los poderes que fueren necesarios; y, 
h) Copias de la solicitud y sus recaudos para el titular del registro. 
Articulo 36".- Tramite de la solicitud 
La solicitud de cancelacion se trasladara al titular del registro, a quien se le concedera un plazo de treinta 
(30) dias para hacer su descargo. Luego de este plazo, el Indecopi resolvera con o sin la contestation 
respectiva. 
TITULO IX 
DEL FONDO PARA EL DESARROLLO DE 
LOS PUEBLOS INDIGENAS 
Articulo 37".- Objeto del Fondo para el Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indigenas 
Crease el Fondo para el Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indigenas con el objeto de contribuir al desarrollo 
integral de los pueblos indigenas a traves del financiamiento de proyectos y otras actividades. Este Fondo 
gozara de autonomia tecnica, economica, administrativa y financiera. 
Articulo 38".- Acceso a los recursos del Fondo para el Desarrollo de los Pueblos y Comunidades 
Indigenas 
Los pueblos indigenas tienen derecho a acceder a los recursos del Fondo para el Desarrollo de los Pueblos 
Indigenas a traves de sus organizaciones representativas y por medio de proyectos de desarrollo, previa 
evaluation y aprobacion del Comite Administrador. 
Articulo 39".- Administration del Fondo para el Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indigenas 
El Fondo para el Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indigenas sera administrado por 5 representantes de 
organizaciones representativas de los pueblos indigenas, y 2 representantes de la Comision Nacional de los 
Pueblos Andinos, Amazonicos y Afroperuanos, los mismos que conformaran el Comite Administrador. 
Este Comite debera utilizar, en la medida de lo posible, los mecanismos tradicionalmente empleados -por 
los pueblos indigenas- para compartir y distribuir beneficios generados colectivamente. 
El Comite Administrador debera informar trimestralmente a las organizaciones representativas de los 
pueblos indigenas sobre los recursos recibidos. 
Articulo 40".- Obligation de presentar declaraciones juradas de los miembros del Comite 
Administrador 
Los miembros del Comite Administrador, al momento de asumir sus cargos y anualmente, deberan 
presentar a la Comision Nacional de los Pueblos Andinos, Amazonicos y Afroperuanos, una declaration 
jurada de bienes y rentas. 
Articulo 41".- Recursos del Fondo para el Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indigenas 
Los recursos del Fondo para el Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indigenas se obtendran del Presupuesto Publico, 
de la cooperation tecnica internacional, de donaciones, del porcentaje de los beneficios economicos a que 
se refieren los Articulos 8° y 13°, de las multas a que se refiere el Articulo 62°, asi como de otros aportes. 
TITULO X 
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DE LA PROTECCION QUE CONFIERE 
ESTE REGIMEN 
Articulo 42".- Derechos de los pueblos indigenas que poseen conocimientos colectivos 
El pueblo indigena que posea un conocimiento colectivo estara protegido contra la revelation, adquisicion 
o uso de tal conocimiento colectivo sin su consentimiento y de manera desleal, en la medida en que este 
conocimiento colectivo no se encuentre en el dominio publico. 
Asimismo, estara protegido contra la divulgation sin autorizacion en caso de que un tercero haya tenido 
acceso legitimamente al conocimiento colectivo pero con deber de reserva. 
Articulo 43°.- Acciones por infraccion de derechos de los pueblos indigenas 
Los pueblos indigenas que poseen conocimientos colectivos pueden interponer accion por infraccion contra 
quien infrinja los derechos que se precisan en el articulo anterior. Tambien precede la accion por infraccion 
cuando exista peligro 
inminente de que estos derechos puedan ser infringidos. 
Las acciones por infraccion podran iniciarse de oficio por decision del Indecopi. 
Articulo 44".- Inversion de la carga de la prueba 
En los casos en que se alegue una infraccion a los derechos de un pueblo indigena poseedor de determinado 
conocimiento colectivo, la carga de la prueba recaera en el denunciado. 
Articulo 45".- Acciones reivindicatorias e indemnizatorias 
Las organizaciones representativas de los pueblos indigenas que poseen conocimientos colectivos podran 
iniciar las acciones reivindicatorias e indemnizatorias que les confiera la legislation vigente contra el 
tercero que, de manera contraria a lo establecido en este regimen, hubiere utilizado, directa o 
indirectamente, dichos conocimientos colectivos. 
Articulo 46".- Solucion de discrepancias entre pueblos indigenas 
Para solucionar las discrepancias que pudieran generarse entre los pueblos indigenas en el marco de 
aplicacion de este regimen, tales como aquellas relacionadas con el cumplimiento por parte del pueblo 
indigena que ha negociado un contrato de licencia de uso de sus conocimientos colectivos de lo dispuesto 
en el segundo parrafo del Articulo 6° de la presente Ley, estos podran recurrir al derecho consuetudinario y 
a sus formas tradicionales de solucion de conflictos, pudiendo contar con la mediation de una organizacion 
indigena superior. 
TITULO XI 
DE LAS ACCIONES POR INFRACCION 
Articulo 47°.- Contenido de la denuncia 
Los pueblos indigenas que deseen interponer una accion por infraccion deberan presentar, a traves de su 
organizacion representativa y ante la Oficina de Invenciones y Nuevas Tecnologias, una solicitud que 
debera contener: 
a) La identificacion de la organizacion representativa de los pueblos indigenas que interponen la accion y 
de sus representantes; 
b) La identificacion y domicilio de la persona que estuviere ejecutando la infraccion; 
c) La indicacion del numero de registro que ampara el derecho del pueblo indigena denunciante o, en su 
defecto, la descripcion del conocimiento colectivo e indicacion del recurso biologico sobre el cual versa el 
conocimiento colectivo materia de la accion; 
d) La descripcion de los hechos constitutivos de la infraccion, con indicacion del lugar y de los medios 
utilizados o presumiblemente utilizados, y cualquier otra information relevante; 
e) La presentation u ofrecimiento de pruebas; y 
f) La indicacion expresa de la medida cautelar que se solicita. 
Articulo 48".- Tramite de la denuncia 
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Una vez admitida a tramite la denuncia, se trasladara la misma al denunciado, a fin de que este presente su 
descargo. El plazo para la presentation del descargo sera de cinco (5) dias contados desde la notification, 
vencido el cual la autoridad administrativa del Indecopi declarara en rebeldia al denunciado que no lo 
hubiera presentado. 
En el caso de los procedimientos de oficio, el plazo para la presentation de descargos correra a partir de la 
fecha en la que la autoridad administrativa notifica al denunciado los hechos materia de investigation, asi 
como la tipificacion y descripci6n de la presunta infraction. La autoridad administrativa del Indecopi podra 
realizar las inspecciones e investigaciones que considere necesarias, antes de enviar dicha comunicacion. 
La notification de la denuncia podra efectuarse simultaneamente con la realization de una inspection, ya 
sea a pedido del denunciante o de oficio, en caso de que la autoridad administrativa del Indecopi considere 
que su actuation sea pertinente. 
Articulo 49".- Medidas cautelares 
En cualquier etapa del procedimiento, de oficio o a pedido de parte, la autoridad administrativa del 
Indecopi podra, dentro del ambito. de su correspondiente competencia, dictar una o varias de las siguientes 
medidas cautelares destinadas a asegurar el cumplimiento de la decision definitiva: 
a) La cesacion de los actos materia de la action; 
b) El decomiso, el deposito o la inmovilizacion de los productos desarrollados a partir del conocimiento 
colectivo materia de la action; 
c) La adoption de las medidas necesarias para que las autoridades aduaneras impidan el ingreso al pais y la 
salida del pais de los productos desarrollados a partir 
del conocimiento colectivo materia de la action; 
d) El cierre temporal del establecimiento del denunciado; y 
e) Cualquier otra medida que tenga por objeto evitar que se produzca algiin perjuicio derivado del acto 
materia de la action o que tenga como finalidad la 
cesacion de este. 
La autoridad administrativa del Indecopi podra, de considerarlo pertinente, ordenar una medida cautelar 
distinta a la solicitada por la parte interesada. 
El afectado por una medida cautelar podra solicitar ante el Indecopi su modification o levantamiento, si 
aporta nuevos elementos de juicio que lo justifiquen. 
Articulo 50".- Incumplimiento de la medida cautelar 
Si el obligado a cumplir con una medida cautelar ordenada por la autoridad administrativa del Indecopi no 
lo hiciera, se le impondra automaticamente una sancion de hasta el maximo de la multa permitida, para 
cuya graduation se tomara en cuenta los criterios que emplea la autoridad administrativa del Indecopi al 
emitir resoluciones finales. Dicha multa debera ser pagada dentro del plazo de cinco (5) dias de notificada, 
vencidos los cuales se ordenara su cobranza coactiva. 
Si el obligado persiste en el incumplimiento, se podra imponer una nueva multa duplicando sucesiva e 
ilimitadamente el monto de la ultima multa impuesta hasta que se cumpla la medida cautelar ordenada y sin 
perjuicio de poder denunciar al responsable ante el Ministerio Publico para que este inicie el proceso penal 
que corresponda. Las multas impuestas no impiden a la autoridad administrativa del Indecopi imponer una 
multa o sancion distinta al final del procedimiento. 
Articulo 51°.- Conciliation 
En cualquier estado del procedimiento, e incluso antes de admitirse a tramite la denuncia, la autoridad 
administrativa competente del Indecopi podra citar a las partes a audiencia de conciliation. Si ambas partes 
arribaran a un acuerdo respecto de la denuncia, se levantara un acta donde conste el acuerdo respectivo, el 
mismo que tendra efectos de transaction extrajudicial. En cualquier caso, la autoridad administrativa del 
Indecopi podra continuar de oficio el procedimiento, 
si del analisis de los hechos denunciados considera que podria estarse afectando intereses de terceros. 
Articulo 52".- Mecanismos alternatives de solution de conflictos 
En cualquier estado del procedimiento, e incluso antes de admitirse a tramite la denuncia, las partes podran 
someterse a arbitraje, mediation, conciliation o mecanismos mixtos de resolution de disputas a cargo de 
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terceros. Si las partes decidieran someterse a arbitraje, podran suscribir inmediatamente el convenio arbitral 
correspondiente, de conformidad con el reglamento que para dicho efecto aprobara el Directorio del 
Indecopi. En cualquier caso, la autoridad administrativa del Indecopi podra continuar de oficio con el 
procedimiento, si del analisis de los hechos denunciados considera que podria estarse afectando intereses de 
terceros. 
Articulo 53".- Medios probatorios 
Las partes podran ofrecer los siguientes medios probatorios: 
a) Pericia; 
b) Documentos, incluyendo todo tipo de escritos, impresos, fotocopias, pianos, cuadros, dibujos, 
radiografias, cintas cinematograficas y otras reproducciones de audio y video, la telematica en general y 
demas objetos y bienes que recojan, contengan o representen algiin hecho, una actividad humana o su 
resultado; y, 
c) Inspeccion. 
Excepcionalmente podran actuarse pruebas distintas a las mencionadas, solo si a criterio de la autoridad 
administrativa competente, estas revisten especial importancia para la resolucion del caso. 
Articulo 54".- Inspeccion 
En caso de que fuera necesaria la realizacion de una inspeccion, esta sera efectuada por la autoridad 
administrativa competente del Indecopi. Siempre que se realice una inspeccion debera levantarse un acta 
que sera firmada por quien estuviera a cargo de la misma, asi como por los interesados, quienes ejerzan su 
representation o por el encargado del establecimiento correspondiente. En caso de que el denunciado, su 
representante o el encargado del establecimiento se negara a hacerlo, se dejara constancia de tal hecho. 
Articulo 55".- Auxilio de la Policia Nacional 
Tanto para la actuacion de las pruebas como para la realizacion de las diligencias, la autoridad 
administrativa del Indecopi podra requerir la intervention de la Policia Nacional, sin necesidad de 
notification previa, a fin de garantizar el cumplimiento de sus funciones. 
Articulo 56".- Actuacion de medios probatorios. Insuiiciencia de pruebas 
Si de la revision de la information presentada, la autoridad administrativa del Indecopi considera necesario 
contar con mayores elementos de juicio, notificara a las partes a fin de que estas absuelvan las 
observaciones que se establezcan en el plazo que aquella determine, o actuara las pruebas de oficio que 
considere necesarias. Las partes deberan absolver las observaciones por escrito, acompanando los medios 
probatorios que consideren convenientes. 
Articulo 57".- Informe oral 
La autoridad administrativa del Indecopi pondra en conocimiento de las partes que lo actuado se encuentra 
expedito para resolver. Las partes podran solicitar la realizacion de un informe oral ante esta, dentro del 
plazo de cinco (5) dias. La actuacion o denegacion de dicha solicitud quedara a criterio de la autoridad 
administrativa del Indecopi, segiin la importancia y trascendencia del caso. 
Articulo 58".- Base de calculo para las multas 
El monto de las multas que aplique la autoridad administrativa del Indecopi sera calculado en base a la U1T 
vigente en el dia del pago voluntario, o en la fecha en que se haga efectiva la cobranza coactiva. 
Articulo 59".- Reduction de la multa 
La sancion de multa aplicable sera rebajada en un veinticinco por ciento (25%) cuando el infractor cancele 
el monto de la misma con anterioridad a la culmination del termino para impugnar la resolucion que puso 
fin a la instancia, en tanto no interponga recurso impugnativo alguno contra dicha resolucidn. 
Articulo 60°.- Gastos por actuacion de medios probatorios 
Los gastos por los peritajes realizados, actuacion de pruebas, inspecciones y otros derivados de la 
tramitacion del proceso seran asumidos inicialmente por el Indecopi. 
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En todos los casos, la resolution final determinant si los gastos deben ser asumidos por alguna de las 
partes, y reembolsados al Indecopi, de manera adicional a la sancion que haya podido imponerse. 
Articulo 61°.- Registro de sanciones 
El Indecopi llevara un registro de las sanciones aplicadas, con la finalidad de informar al publico, asi como 
para detectar casos de reincidencia. 
Articulo 62°.- Sanciones 
Las infracciones a los derechos de los pueblos indigenas que poseen conocimientos colectivos daran lugar a 
la aplicacion de una sancion de multa, sin perjuicio de las 
medidas que se dicten para la cesacion de los actos de infraction o para evitar que estos se produzcan. 
Las multas que podran establecerse seran de hasta ciento cincuenta (150) UIT. La imposition y graduation 
de las multas sera determinada, teniendo en consideration el beneficio economico obtenido por el infractor, 
el perjuicio economico ocasionado 
a los pueblos y comunidades indigenas y la conducta del infractor a lo largo del procedimiento. La 
reincidencia se considerara circunstancia agravante, por lo que la sancion aplicable no debera ser menor 
que la sancion precedente. 
Si el obligado no cumple en un plazo de tres (3) dias con lo ordenado en la resolution que pone fin a un 
procedimiento, se le impondra una sancion de hasta el maximo de la multa permitida, segiin los criterios a 
los que hace referenda el articulo precedente, y se ordenara su cobranza coactiva. Si el obligado persiste en 
el incumplimiento, se podra duplicar sucesiva e ilimitadamente la multa impuesta hasta que se cumpla la 
resolution, sin perjuicio de poder denunciar al responsable ante el Ministerio Publico para que este inicie el 
proceso penal que corresponda. 
TITULO XII 
DE LA AUTORIDAD NACIONAL COMPETENTE 
Y DEL CONSEJO ESPECIALIZADO EN LA 
PROTECTION DE CONOCIMIENTOS INDIGENAS 
Articulo 63°.- Autoridad National Competente 
La Oficina de Invenciones y Nuevas Tecnologias del Instituto National de Defensa de la Competencia y de 
la Protection de la Propiedad Intelectual (Indecopi) es competente para conocer y resolver en primera 
instancia todo lo relativo a la protection de los conocimientos colectivos de los pueblos indigenas. 
La Sala de Propiedad Intelectual del Tribunal de Defensa de la Competencia y de la Propiedad Intelectual 
del Indecopi conocera y resolvera los recursos de apelacion en segunda y ultima instancia administrativa. 
Articulo 64°.- Funciones de la Oficina de Invenciones y Nuevas Tecnologias 
Seran funciones de la Oficina de Invenciones y Nuevas Tecnologias del Indecopi: 
a) Llevar y mantener el Registro de Conocimientos Colectivos de los Pueblos Indigenas. 
b) Llevar y mantener el Registro de Licencias de Uso de Conocimientos Colectivos. 
c) Evaluar la validez de los contratos de licencias sobre conocimientos colectivos de los pueblos indigenas, 
tomando en cuenta la opinion del Consejo especializado 
en la protection de conocimientos indigenas. 
d) Ejercer las demas funciones que se le encargan mediante el presente dispositive 
Articulo 65°.- Consejo especializado en la protection de conocimientos indigenas 
El Consejo especializado en la protection de conocimientos indigenas estara integrado por 5 (cinco) 
personas especializadas en el tema, 3 (tres) designadas por las organizaciones representativas de los 
pueblos indigenas, y 2 (dos) designadas por la Comision Nacional de los Pueblos Andinos, Amazonicos y 
Afroperuanos, quienes asumiran el cargo de miembros de este Consejo de manera ad honorem. 
Articulo 66°.- Funciones del Consejo especializado en la protection 
de conocimientos indigenas 
Seran funciones del Consejo especializado en la protection de conocimientos indigenas: 
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a) Monitorear y hacer seguimiento de la aplicacion de este regimen de protection; 
b) Apoyar al Comite Administrador del Fondo para el Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indigenas, y a la Oficina 
de Invenciones y Nuevas Tecnologias del Indecopi, 
en el desempeno de sus funciones; 
c) Emitir opinion en cuanto a la validez de los contratos de licencias sobre conocimientos colectivos de los 
pueblos indigenas; 
d) Brindar asesoria a los representantes de los pueblos indigenas que asi lo soliciten en asuntos vinculados 
con este regimen, en particular, en la elaboration 
y ejecucion de proyectos, en el marco de este regimen; y 
e) Supervisar al Comite Administrador del Fondo para el Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indigenas en el 
ejercicio de sus funciones. 
Para estos efectos, podra exigir al Comite Administrador cualquier tipo de information relacionada con la 
administration del Fondo, ordenar inspecciones o auditorias, examinar sus libros, documentos y designar 
un representante que asista con voz pero sin voto a sus reuniones. La resolution que ordene la practica 
de una auditoria debera ser motivada. Estara facultada para imponerles sanciones, tales como la 
amonestacion, la suspension temporal en el ejercicio de sus funciones o la separation definitiva de sus 
cargos, en caso de que infrinjan las disposiciones del presente regimen o su reglamento, o que incurran en 
hechos que afecten los intereses de los pueblos y comunidades indigenas, sin perjuicio de las sanciones 
penales o de las acciones 
civiles que correspondan. 
TITULO XIII 
RECURSOS ADMINISTRATIVOS 
Articulo 67°.- Recurso de reconsideration 
Contra las resoluciones expedidas por la Oficina de Invenciones y Nuevas Tecnologias puede interponerse 
recurso de reconsideration, dentro de los quince (15) dias siguientes a su notification, el mismo que debera 
ser acompanado con nueva prueba. 
Articulo 68°.- Recurso de apelacion 
Procede interponer recurso de apelacion unicamente contra la resolution que ponga fin a la instancia, 
expedida por la Oficina de Invenciones y Nuevas Tecnologias, dentro de los quince (15) dias siguientes a 
su notification. No procede interponer recurso de apelacion contra las resoluciones de primera 
instancia que imponen medidas cautelares o preventivas. 
Articulo 69°.- Sustento de recurso de apelacion 
Los recursos de apelacion se interpondran cuando la impugnacion se sustente en diferente interpretation de 
las pruebas producidas o cuando se trate de cuestiones de puro derecho, debiendo ser sustentados por ante 
la Oficina 
de Invenciones y Nuevas Tecnologias. Verificados los requisitos establecidos en el presente articulo y en el 
Texto Unico de Procedimientos Administrativos (TUPA) del Indecopi, la Oficina debera conceder la 
apelacion y elevar los 
actuados a la segunda instancia administrativa. 
TITULO XIV 
PROCEDIMIENTO ANTE EL TRIBUNAL 
Articulo 70°.- Tramite en segunda instancia 
Recibidos los actuados por la Sala de la Propiedad Intelectual del Tribunal de Defensa de la Competencia y 
de la Propiedad Intelectual del Indecopi, se correra traslado de la apelacion a la otra parte para que cumpla 
con presentar 
sus argumentos, dentro del plazo de quince (15) dias. 
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Articulo 71°.- Medios probatorios e informe oral 
No se admitiran medios probatorios, salvo documentos. 
Sin perjuicio de ello, cualquiera de las partes podra solicitar el uso de la palabra, debiendo especificar si 
este se referira a cuestiones de hecho o de derecho. La actuation o denegacion de dicha solicitud quedara a 
criterio de la Sala del Tribunal. Citadas las partes a informe oral, este se llevara a cabo con quienes asistan 
a la audiencia. 
DISPOSICIONES COMPLEMENT ARIAS 
PRIMERA.- Independencia de la legislation vigente en materia de propiedad intelectual 
Este regimen especial de protection es independiente de lo previsto en las Decisiones 345 de la Comision 
del Acuerdo de Cartagena y 486 de la Comision de la Comunidad Andina, en los Decretos Legislatives 
Nums. 822 y 823 y en el Decreto Supremo N° 008-96-ITINCI. 
SEGUNDA.- Presentation del contrato de licencia como requisito para obtener una patente de invencion 
En caso de que se solicite una patente de invencion relacionada con productos o procesos obtenidos o 
desarrollados a partir de un conocimiento colectivo, el solicitante estara obligado a presentar una copia del 
contrato de licencia, como requisito previo para la concesion del respectivo derecho, a menos de que se 
trate de un conocimiento colectivo que se encuentra en el dominio publico. El incumplimiento de esta 
obligation sera causal de denegacion o, en su caso, de nulidad de la patente en cuestion. 
DISPOSICION TRANSITOPJA 
UNICA.- Conformation del Comite Administrador del Fondo para el Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indigenas 
La designation de los miembros del Comite Administrador del Fondo para el Desarrollo de los Pueblos 
Indigenas estara a cargo de la Comision Nacional de los Pueblos Andinos, Amazonicos y Afroperuanos, en 
coordination con las 
organizaciones representativas de los pueblos indigenas. 
DISPOSICION FINAL 
UNICA.- Reglamento del Fondo para el Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indigenas 
Dentro del plazo de noventa (90) dias contados a partir de la entrada en vigencia de la presente Ley, las 
organizaciones representativas de los pueblos indigenas alcanzaran un proyecto de Reglamento al Comite 
de Administration del Fondo para el Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indigenas a que se contrae el Articulo 39° 
de la presente Ley, para su aprobacion. 
Dicho Reglamento debera regular la organization y funcionamiento del Fondo para el Desarrollo de los 
Pueblos Indigenas, en el cual se determinant el monto o porcentaje maximo de los recursos del fondo que 
se podra destinar a sufragar los gastos que irrogue su administration. 
Comuniquese al senor Presidente de la Repiiblica para su promulgation. 
En Lima, a los veinticuatro dias del mes de julio de dos mil dos. 
CARLOS FERRERO 
Presidente del Congreso de la Republica 
HENRY PEASE GARCiA 
Primer Vicepresidente del Congreso de la Republica 
AL SENOR PRESIDENTE CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA REPUBLICA 
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POR TANTO: 
Mando se publique y cumpla. 
Dado en la Casa de Gobiemo, en Lima, a los ocho dias del mes de agosto del ano dos mil dos. 
ALEJANDO TOLEDO 
Presidente Constitutional de la Republica 
LUIS SOLARI DE LA FUENTE 
Presidente del Consejo de Ministros 
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